IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/enreec/v63y2016i2d10.1007_s10640-015-9951-8.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Flexibility and Stringency in Greenhouse Gas Regulations

Author

Listed:
  • Dallas Burtraw

    (Resources for the Future)

  • Matt Woerman

    (University of California)

  • Alan Krupnick

    (Resources for the Future)

Abstract

The Clean Air Act provides the regulatory framework for climate policy in the United States. Emissions rate performance standards are the metric identified for regulation of the electricity sector, the most important source of emissions. Rates for existing sources could be averaged to achieve flexibility in compliance, although the stringency of policies is ambiguous when flexibility is introduced. For example, a specific emissions rate improvement averaged over a larger set of generators may reduce the actual emissions change. We evaluate three policy designs according to emissions rate, emissions and marginal cost and show how a marginal abatement cost criterion can be applied within a technology-based regulation. This approach can quadruple the emissions reductions that are achieved, with net social benefits exceeding $25 billion in 2020, and with a 1.3 % electricity price increase. Over half of the benefits stem from improvements in conventional air quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Dallas Burtraw & Matt Woerman & Alan Krupnick, 2016. "Flexibility and Stringency in Greenhouse Gas Regulations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(2), pages 225-248, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:63:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s10640-015-9951-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-015-9951-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10640-015-9951-8
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10640-015-9951-8?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Newell, Richard G. & Rogers, Kristian, 2003. "The Market-based Lead Phasedown," Discussion Papers 10445, Resources for the Future.
    2. Markandya Anil & Rübbelke Dirk T.G., 2004. "Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy / Sekundäre Nutzen der Klimapolitik," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 224(4), pages 488-503, August.
    3. Laurie Johnson & Chris Hope, 2012. "The social cost of carbon in U.S. regulatory impact analyses: an introduction and critique," Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, Springer;Association of Environmental Studies and Sciences, vol. 2(3), pages 205-221, September.
    4. Burtraw, Dallas & Woerman, Matt, 2013. "Economic ideas for a complex climate policy regime," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(S1), pages 24-31.
    5. Joshua Linn & Erin Mastrangelo & Dallas Burtraw, 2014. "Regulating Greenhouse Gases from Coal Power Plants under the Clean Air Act," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 97-134.
    6. Alberto Longo & David Hoyos & Anil Markandya, 2012. "Willingness to Pay for Ancillary Benefits of Climate Change Mitigation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 51(1), pages 119-140, January.
    7. Oates, Wallace E & Portney, Paul R & McGartland, Albert M, 1989. "The Net Benefits of Incentive-Based Regulation: A Case Study of Environmental Standard Setting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1233-1242, December.
    8. Paul, Anthony & Beasley, Blair & Palmer, Karen, 2013. "Taxing Electricity Sector Carbon Emissions at Social Cost," RFF Working Paper Series dp-13-23-rev, Resources for the Future.
    9. J. Refsgaard & K. Arnbjerg-Nielsen & M. Drews & K. Halsnæs & E. Jeppesen & H. Madsen & A. Markandya & J. Olesen & J. Porter & J. Christensen, 2013. "The role of uncertainty in climate change adaptation strategies—A Danish water management example," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 337-359, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Woerman, Matt, 2023. "Linking carbon markets with different initial conditions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
    2. Bielen, David A., 2018. "Do differentiated performance standards help coal? CO2 policy in the U.S. electricity sector," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 79-100.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dallas Burtraw & Josh Linn & Karen Palmer & Anthony Paul, 2014. "The Costs and Consequences of Clean Air Act Regulation of CO2 from Power Plants," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 557-562, May.
    2. Burtraw, Dallas & Woerman, Matt, 2013. "Technology Flexibility and Stringency for Greenhouse Gas Regulations," RFF Working Paper Series dp-13-24, Resources for the Future.
    3. Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher & Anil Markandya & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2011. "The Private Provision of International Impure Public Goods: the Case of Climate Policy," Working Papers 2011-09, BC3.
    4. Paul, Anthony & Palmer, Karen & Woerman, Matt, 2014. "Designing by Degrees: Flexibility and Cost-Effectiveness in Climate PolicyAbstract: Substantially reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from electricity production will require a transformation of t," RFF Working Paper Series dp-14-05, Resources for the Future.
    5. Burtraw, Dallas & Fraas, Arthur G. & Richardson, Nathan, 2012. "Tradable Standards for Clean Air Act Carbon Policy," RFF Working Paper Series dp-12-05, Resources for the Future.
    6. Marc Daube & David Ulph, 2016. "Moral Behaviour, Altruism and Environmental Policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(2), pages 505-522, February.
    7. Zhang, Zibin & Yang, Wenxin & Ye, Jianliang, 2021. "Why sulfur dioxide emissions decline significantly from coal-fired power plants in China? Evidence from the desulfurated electricity pricing premium program," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 148(PB).
    8. Massimiliano Mazzanti & Valeria Costantini & Susanna Mancinelli & Massimilano Corradini, 2011. "Environmental and Innovation Performance in a Dynamic Impure Public Good Framework," Working Papers 201117, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.
    9. Dienes, Christian, 2015. "Actions and intentions to pay for climate change mitigation: Environmental concern and the role of economic factors," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 122-129.
    10. Smith, Kerry & Schwabe, Kurt A. & Mansfield, Carol, 1997. "Does Nature Limit Environmental Federalism?," Working Papers 97-01, Duke University, Department of Economics.
    11. Zhang, Hong & Jin, Gui & Zhang, Zhengyu, 2021. "Coupling system of carbon emission and social economy: A review," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    12. Burtraw, Dallas & Mansur, Erin, 1999. "The Effects of Trading and Banking in the SO2 Allowance Market," RFF Working Paper Series dp-99-25, Resources for the Future.
    13. Richard S.J. Tol, 2021. "Estimates of the social cost of carbon have not changed over time," Working Paper Series 0821, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
    14. Koji Kotani & Makoto Kakinaka, 2017. "Some implications of environmental regulation on social welfare under learning-by-doing of eco-products," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 19(1), pages 121-149, January.
    15. Kling, Catherine & Rubin, Jonathan, 1997. "Bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 101-115, April.
    16. Feldhaus, Christoph & Gleue, Marvin & Löschel, Andreas & Werner, Peter, 2022. "Co-benefits motivate individual donations to mitigate climate change," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    17. Havranek, Tomas & Irsova, Zuzana & Janda, Karel & Zilberman, David, 2015. "Selective reporting and the social cost of carbon," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 394-406.
    18. Richard J. Mccann, 1996. "Environmental Commodities Markets: ‘Messy’ Versus ‘Ideal’ Worlds," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(3), pages 85-97, July.
    19. Newell, Richard G & Stavins, Robert N, 2003. "Cost Heterogeneity and the Potential Savings from Market-Based Policies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 43-59, January.
    20. Palmer, Karen & Burtraw, Dallas & Paul, Anthony & Yin, Hang, 2017. "Using Production Incentives to Avoid Emissions Leakage," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(S1), pages 45-56.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Climate policy; Efficiency; EPA; Clean Air Act; Coal; Compliance flexibility; Regulation; Ancillary benefits;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:63:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s10640-015-9951-8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.