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Evolution of Reciprocity in Asymmetric International Environmental Negotiations

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  • Marius Ochea

    ()

  • Aart Zeeuw

    ()

Abstract

We study the success of generalised trigger strategies in the evolution of cooperation in international environmental negotiations where the performance of these strategies is derived from asymmetric $$n$$ n -player prisoners’ dilemmas. Our results suggest that there exist regions in the relevant parameter space—i.e. costs and benefits, low and high tit-for-tat thresholds, probability of continued interaction—such that (partial) cooperation may emerge as long-run attractor of the evolutionary dynamics in these asymmetric social dilemmas. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Marius Ochea & Aart Zeeuw, 2015. "Evolution of Reciprocity in Asymmetric International Environmental Negotiations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 837-854, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:62:y:2015:i:4:p:837-854
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-014-9841-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jörg Rieskamp & Peter Todd, 2006. "The Evolution of Cooperative Strategies for Asymmetric Social Interactions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 69-111, February.
    2. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    3. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, March.
    4. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2269-2302, November.
    5. Matthew McGinty, 2007. "International environmental agreements among asymmetric nations," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 45-62, January.
    6. Fuentes-Albero, Cristina & Rubio, Santiago J., 2010. "Can international environmental cooperation be bought?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 202(1), pages 255-264, April.
    7. Matthew McGinty, 2010. "International Environmental Agreements as Evolutionary Games," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(2), pages 251-269, February.
    8. Pierre Courtois & Jean-Christophe Péreau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(1), pages 31-51.
    9. Michèle Breton & Lucia Sbragia & Georges Zaccour, 2010. "A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(1), pages 25-48, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International environmental negotiations; Tit-for-tat; Replicator dynamics; Asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma; C72; C73; D62; H77;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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