International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries: Climate Clubs vs. Global Cooperation
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Achim Hagen & Leonhard Kaehler & Klaus Eisenack, 2016. "Transnational Environmental Agreements with Heterogeneous Actors," Working Papers V-387-16, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2016.
- Soham Baksi & Amrita Ray Chaudhuri, 2016. "International Trade and Environmental Cooperation among Heterogeneous Countries," Departmental Working Papers 2016-03, The University of Winnipeg, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
KeywordsMultiple International Environmental Agreements; Coalition Formation;
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2015-12-12 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2015-12-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2015-12-12 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2015-12-12 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2015-12-12 (Game Theory)
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