IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fem/femwpa/2015.58.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries: Climate Clubs vs. Global Cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Achim Hagen

    (Carl von Ossietzky University Oldenburg, Germany)

  • Klaus Eisenack

    (Carl von Ossietzky University Oldenburg, Germany)

Abstract

We investigate whether global cooperation for emission abatement can be improved if asymmetric countries can sign different parallel environmental agreements. The analysis assumes a two-stage game theoretical model. Conditions for self-enforcing sets of agreements and the resulting total emission abatement are determined. We allow for multiple coalitions with multiple types of asymmetric countries. We then analyze the effect of multiple coalitions for the case of increasing marginal costs of abatement as well as for decreasing marginal benefits of abatement more generally. The results are sensitive to the assumptions on the benefits from abatement. For constant marginal benefits, the possibility of multiple agreements increases the number of cooperating countries and total abatement (compared to the standard case with a single agreement). For decreasing marginal benefits, total emissions are independent of the number of admitted agreements. The paper thus contributes to the emerging discussion on the scope and limits of climate clubs.

Suggested Citation

  • Achim Hagen & Klaus Eisenack, 2015. "International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries: Climate Clubs vs. Global Cooperation," Working Papers 2015.58, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2015.58
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/20156221022324NDL2015-058.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Asheim, Geir B. & Froyn, Camilla Bretteville & Hovi, Jon & Menz, Fredric C., 2006. "Regional versus global cooperation for climate control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 93-109, January.
    2. Michael Finus, 2001. "Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2118.
    3. Marta Biancardi & Giovanni Villani, 2010. "International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 36(1), pages 69-92, June.
    4. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    5. Robert Falkner & Hannes Stephan & John Vogler, 2010. "International climate policy after Copenhagen: towards a ´┐Żbuilding blocks´┐Ż approach," GRI Working Papers 21, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    6. Elinor Ostrom, 2012. "Nested externalities and polycentric institutions: must we wait for global solutions to climate change before taking actions at other scales?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(2), pages 353-369, February.
    7. Matthew McGinty, 2007. "International environmental agreements among asymmetric nations," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 45-62, January.
    8. Heugues, Melanie, 2012. "Endogenous Timing in Pollution Control: Stackelberg versus Cournot-Nash Equilibria," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 2(2), pages 133-158, July.
    9. Dritan Osmani & Richard Tol, 2010. "The Case of two Self-Enforcing International Agreements for Environmental Protection with Asymmetric Countries," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 36(2), pages 93-119, August.
    10. Fuentes-Albero, Cristina & Rubio, Santiago J., 2010. "Can international environmental cooperation be bought?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 202(1), pages 255-264, April.
    11. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    12. Finus, Michael, 2008. "Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 29-67, June.
    13. repec:zbw:hohpro:344 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Richard Stewart & Michael Oppenheimer & Bryce Rudyk, 2013. "A new strategy for global climate protection," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 120(1), pages 1-12, September.
    15. Barrett, Scott, 2001. "International cooperation for sale," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1835-1850, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Achim Hagen & Leonhard Kaehler & Klaus Eisenack, 2016. "Transnational Environmental Agreements with Heterogeneous Actors," Working Papers V-387-16, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2016.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multiple International Environmental Agreements; Coalition Formation;

    JEL classification:

    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2015.58. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (barbara racah). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/feemmit.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.