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Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux

  • Pierre COURTOIS

    (CNRS - EHESS - CIRED et Université Paris 10 - MODEM)

  • Jean-Christophe PEREAU

    (Université de Marne La Vallée - O.E.P.)

  • Tarik TAZDAIT

    (Université de Marne La Vallée - O.E.P.)

Le présent papier s'articule autour des problèmes environnementaux globaux, et se propose de lier les négociations internationales au comportement de précaution. Cela nous conduit à montrer que le comportement de précaution peut aussi bien survenir à la suite d'un échec des négociations qu'à la conclusion d'un accord. Dans le premier cas, ce comportement a moins d'impact que la coopération de tous, mais tend tout de même à réduire la portée de la défection. Dans le second cas, si un accord est signé entre un petit nombre de pays, le comportement de précaution constitue un moyen d'élargir la portée de la coopération sans déstabiliser la coalition coopérante. Nous montrons, enfin, que l'adoption de sanctions à l’encontre des pays non-coopérants ne garantit pas pour autant l'émergence d'un large mouvement de coopération.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) with number 2004012.

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Length: 22
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2004012
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