Coopération internationale et problèmes environnementaux globaux : vision normative versus vision positive
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- William D. Nordhaus, 1999. "Biens publics globaux et changement climatique," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 14(3), pages 11-32.
- Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
"Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
- David Kreps & Paul Milgrom & John Roberts & Bob Wilson, 2010. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 239, David K. Levine.
- Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006.
"The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities,"
Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 153-175,
Springer.
- Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
- Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Working Papers 886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1995. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1995050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., 1997. "The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1276, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Buchanan, James M & Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 139-147, March.
- Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983.
"On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
- d'ASPREMONT, Claude & JACQUEMIN, Alexis & GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & WEYMARK, John A., 1983. "On the stability of collusive price leadership," LIDAM Reprints CORE 522, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Donsimoni, Marie-Paule & Economides, Nicholas S & Polemarchakis, Herakles M, 1986. "Stable Cartels," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(2), pages 317-327, June.
- Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006.
"A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution,"
Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 176-193,
Springer.
- Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 1995. "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 2(2), pages 279-293, August.
- Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," Working Papers 897, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1994048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., 1995. "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1158, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Hoel, Michael, 1991.
"Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
- Hoel, M., 1989. "Global Environmental Problems: The Effects Of Unilateral Actions Taken By One Country," Memorandum 1989_011, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993.
"Strategies for the international protection of the environment,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2001.
"Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 20(3), pages 225-239, November.
- Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2001. "Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment inthe Presence of Global EnvironmentalProblems," Post-Print halshs-00009889, HAL.
- Gilles Rotillon & Tarik Tazdaït, 1996. "International bargaining in the presence of global environmental change," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(3), pages 293-314, October.
- Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
- Axelrod, Robert, 1986. "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1095-1111, December.
- T. H. Tietenberg, 1990. "Using Economic Incentives to Maintain Our Environment," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(2), pages 42-46, March.
- Maler, Karl-Goran, 1990. "International Environmental Problems," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 6(1), pages 80-108, Spring.
- Michael Hoel, 1991.
"Efficient International Agreements for Reducing Emissions of CO2,"
The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 93-108.
- Hoel, M., 1990. "Efficient International Agreements For Reducing Emissions Of Co2," Memorandum 1990_006, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- R. H. Coase, 2013.
"The Problem of Social Cost,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
- Ronald H. Coase, 1960. "The Problem of Social Cost," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 5, pages 87-137, Palgrave Macmillan.
- William R. Cline, 1992. "Economics of Global Warming, The," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 39, January.
- Hoel, Michael, 1992. "Carbon taxes : An international tax or harmonized domestic taxes?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 400-406, April.
- Cline, William R, 1991. "Scientific Basis for the Greenhouse Effect," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(407), pages 904-919, July.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1992. "The international dimension of environmental policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 379-387, April.
- Rotillon, Gilles & Tazdait, Tarik & Zeghni, Sylvain, 1996.
"Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change?,"
Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 177-187, August.
- Sylvain Zeghni & Gilles Rotillon & Tarik Tazdait, 1996. "Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change?," Post-Print hal-01100892, HAL.
- McGartland, Albert M. & Oates, Wallace E., 1985. "Marketable permits for the prevention of environmental deterioration," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 207-228, September.
- Na, Seong-lin & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 173-185, April.
- George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
- Barrett, Scott, 1990. "The Problem of Global Environmental Protection," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 6(1), pages 68-79, Spring.
- Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
- Robert J. Smith, 1981. "Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 1(2), pages 439-468, Fall.
- Pamela Chasek, 1997. "A Comparative Analysis of Multilateral Environmental Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 6(5), pages 437-461, September.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Pierre Courtois & Jean-Christophe Péreau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2004.
"Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux,"
Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(1), pages 31-51.
- P. Courtois & J.-C. Pércau & T. Tazdaït, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Post-Print hal-00719284, HAL.
- Pierre COURTOIS & Jean-Christophe PEREAU & Tarik TAZDAIT, 2004. "Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2004012, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2001.
"Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 20(3), pages 225-239, November.
- Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2001. "Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment inthe Presence of Global EnvironmentalProblems," Post-Print halshs-00009889, HAL.
- Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
- Carraro, Carlo & Bosello, Francesco & Buchner, Barbara & Raggi, Davide, 2003. "Can Equity Enhance Efficiency? Some Lessons from Climate Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3606, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori, 2003.
"Stable coalitions,"
Chapters, in: Carlo Carraro (ed.), The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, chapter 5,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen, 2002. "Stable Coalitions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Finus, Michael & Rundshagen, Bianca, 1998. "Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 145-186, July.
- Roger Fouquet, 2012. "Economics of Energy and Climate Change: Origins, Developments and Growth," Working Papers 2012-08, BC3.
- A. Caparrós & J.-C. Péreau & T. Tazdaït, 2004.
"North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 455-480, February.
- Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2003. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2003.09, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Alexandro Caparros & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2004. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations:a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Post-Print halshs-00009823, HAL.
- Rotillon, Gilles & Tazdait, Tarik & Zeghni, Sylvain, 1996.
"Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change?,"
Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 177-187, August.
- Sylvain Zeghni & Gilles Rotillon & Tarik Tazdait, 1996. "Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change?," Post-Print hal-01100892, HAL.
- Buchholz Wolfgang & Heindl Peter, 2015. "Ökonomische Herausforderungen des Klimawandels," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 16(4), pages 324-350, December.
- Kolstad, Charles D., 2007. "Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 68-79, January.
- Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Sonia Oreffice, 2009.
"Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 42(3), pages 411-425, March.
- Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Sonia Oreffice, 2003. "Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties," Working Papers 2003.113, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen & Oreffice, Sonia, 2004. "Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties," CEPR Discussion Papers 4281, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009.
"The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model,"
Working Papers
2009.64, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Bosetti, Valentina & Carraro, Carlo & De Cian, Enrica & Duval, Romain & Massetti, Emanuele & Tavoni, Massimo, 2009. "The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model," Sustainable Development Papers 54281, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Ngo Van Long, 2014. "The Green Paradox in Open Economies," CESifo Working Paper Series 4639, CESifo.
- Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006.
"New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming,"
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(4), pages 391-414, December.
- Michael Finus & Johan Eyckmans, 2003. "New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming," Working Papers 2003.88, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2003. "New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0318, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2008. "Evolution in time of Farsightedly Stable Coalitions: An Application of FUND," Working Papers FNU-162, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2008.
- Ansink, Erik & Gengenbach, Michael & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2012.
"River Sharing and Water Trade,"
Climate Change and Sustainable Development
122860, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Erik Ansink & Michael Gengenbach & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2015. "River Sharing and Water Trade," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-001/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Weikard, Hans-Peter & Ansink, Erik & Gengenbach, Michael, 2013. "River Sharing and Water Trade," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79931, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Erik Ansink & Michael Gengenbach & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2012. "River Sharing and Water Trade," Working Papers 2012.17, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Thoron, Sylvie & Sol, Emmanuel & Willinger, Marc, 2009.
"Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma?,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1271-1282, December.
- Emmanuel Sol & Sylvie Thoron & Marc Willinger, 2006. "Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma ?," Working Papers halshs-00410776, HAL.
- Emmanuel Sol & Sylvie Thoron & Marc Willinger, 2007. "Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma?," Working Papers 07-09, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2007.
- Sylvie Thoron & Emmanuel Sol & Marc Willinger, 2009. "Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma?," Post-Print hal-02665220, HAL.
- Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, 2006.
"Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(2), pages 247-263, May.
- Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Sartzetakis, Eftichios, "undated". "Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach," Economics Working Papers 2001-10, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
- Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios Sartzetakis, 2002. "Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach," Others 0201001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, 2001. "Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach," Working Papers 04001, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2003.
- Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 2006.
"Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion,"
Coalition Theory Network Working Papers
12170, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 2009. "Cooperation, stability, and self-enforcement in international environmental agreements: a conceptual discussion," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2092, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability And Self- Enforcement In International Environmental Agreements : A Conceptual Discussion," Microeconomics Working Papers 22565, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 2006. "Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in international environmental agreements: a conceptual discussion," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2006003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Henry, TULKENS & Parkash, CHANDER, 2006. "Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in interational environmental agreements : a conceptual discussion," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006003, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques, revised 15 Jan 2006.
- Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion," Working Papers 2006.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:edddbu:edd_171_0101. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceauvfr.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.