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International Environmental Problems

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  • Maler, Karl-Goran

Abstract

A simple taxonomy of international environmental problems is developed, based on economic considerations. The unidirectional externalities are illustrated by the case of one upstream and one downstream country. The main problem in this case is an informational one. The analysis of regional reciprocal externalities is illustrated by the acid rains in Europe. It is shown that an efficient solution could be achieved by transferable "export" rights. Finally, global external problems are discussed with reference to greenhouse effects and extinction of species. Copyright 1990 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Maler, Karl-Goran, 1990. "International Environmental Problems," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 6(1), pages 80-108, Spring.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:6:y:1990:i:1:p:80-108
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Querou, 2018. "Interacting collective action problems in the commons," Working Papers halshs-01936007, HAL.
    2. Charles F. Mason & Victoria I. Umanskaya & Edward B. Barbier, 2018. "Trade, Transboundary Pollution, and Foreign Lobbying," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 70(1), pages 223-248, May.
    3. Alexandre SAUQUET, 2011. "Exploring the Nature of Strategic Interactions in the Ratification Process of the Kyoto Protocol," Working Papers 201119, CERDI.
    4. George Halkos, 1996. "Incomplete information in the acid rain game," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 129-148, June.
    5. Costello, Christopher & Quérou, Nicolas & Tomini, Agnes, 2015. "Partial enclosure of the commons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 69-78.
    6. Norimichi Matsueda, 2002. "Asymmetrical information and delay of a side payment in unidirectional transboundary pollution," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 5(3), pages 229-247, September.
    7. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1994. "North-South trade, property rights and the dynamics of environmental resources," MPRA Paper 8415, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Halkos, George, 1996. "Evaluating the direct costs of controlling NOx emissions in Europe," MPRA Paper 33253, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Marianna Khachaturyan & Karina Schoengold, 2019. "Applying Interconnected Game Theory to Analyze Transboundary Waters: A Case Study of the Kura–Araks Basin," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(01), pages 1-32, January.
    10. Halkos, George, 1993. "An evaluation of the direct costs of abatement under the main desulphurisation technologies," MPRA Paper 32588, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Gilles Rotillon & Tazdaït Tarik, 2003. "Coopération internationale et problèmes environnementaux globaux : vision normative versus vision positive," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 11(1), pages 101-134.
    12. A. Nentjes, 1994. "Financial Instruments for the Control of Transboundary Pollution," Working Papers wp94024, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    13. B.S., Min, 2001. "Regional cooperation for control of transboundary air pollution in East Asia," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 137-153.
    14. Hugh Ward, 1993. "Game Theory and the Politics of the Global Commons," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(2), pages 203-235, June.
    15. Halkos, George, 1997. "Modelling optimal nitrogen oxides abatement in Europe," MPRA Paper 33132, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Mariana Conte Grand, 1999. "Do Regional Environmental Agreements Have any Effects onWater Quality?," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 141, Universidad del CEMA.
    17. Henry Van Egteren & Jianmin Tang, 1997. "Maxium Victim Benefit: A Fair Division Process in Transboundary Pollution Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 10(4), pages 363-386, December.
    18. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1994. "Property rights and the dynamics of renewable resources in North-South trade, Chapter 1," MPRA Paper 8513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Schmid, Stefanie U., 1997. "Umweltpolitik und internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit," Kiel Working Papers 823, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    20. Barret, Scott & DEC, 1994. "Conflict and cooperation in managing international water resources," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1303, The World Bank.
    21. David Maddison, 2007. "Modelling sulphur emissions in Europe: a spatial econometric approach," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 726-743, October.
    22. A.V. Kryazhimskii & A. Nentjes & S. Shibayev & A.M. Tarasyev, 1998. "Searching Market Equilibria under Uncertain Utilities," Working Papers ir98007, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.

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