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River Sharing and Water Trade

Author

Listed:
  • Ansink, Erik
  • Gengenbach, Michael
  • Weikard, Hans-Peter

Abstract

We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory.

Suggested Citation

  • Ansink, Erik & Gengenbach, Michael & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2012. "River Sharing and Water Trade," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 122860, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemcl:122860
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.122860
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    Cited by:

    1. Nadine Wittmann, 2014. "A Microeconomic Perspective on Water Resources Management: Analyzing the Effects on Optimal Land Rents Along a River Basin," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 28(5), pages 1309-1325, March.
    2. Kong, Wen & Knapp, Keith C., 2014. "Economic and Political Equilibrium for a Renewable Natural Resource with International Trade," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 170591, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    3. Erik Ansink & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2015. "Composition properties in the river claims problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 807-831, April.
    4. Nadine Wittmann, 2014. "A Note on Distortional Distributional Effects in River Basin Discharge Permit Trade," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 28(1), pages 279-285, January.
    5. Maryam Jafroudi, 2018. "Enhancing climate resilience of transboundary water allocation agreements: the impact of shortening the agreement’s lifetime on cooperation stability," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(5), pages 707-722, October.
    6. Grundel, S., 2015. "Essays on cooperation in resource allocation and scheduling," Other publications TiSEM c2d78915-6b6f-4f8b-b601-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Erik Ansink & Harold Houba, 2014. "The Economics of Transboundary River Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-132/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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