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Empire-Building and Price Competition

Author

Listed:
  • Antoine Pietri

  • Tarik Tazdait

    (CIRED - centre international de recherche sur l'environnement et le développement - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AgroParisTech - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Mehrdad Vahabi

    (ERASME - Recherche et analyse des sociétés Maghreb-Europe - UP8 - Université Paris 8)

Abstract

While economic historians have stressed the importance of price competition in the protection market, theorists of conflictual activity have argued against the extrapolation of this form of competition in the protection market and favored competition through the quantity of conflictual effort. We purport to show the relevance of price competition in the protection market by focusing on the competition between empires. By distinguishing absolute and differential protection rents, we first define coercive rivalry and price competition among empires and then establish three types of empires, namely early empires of domination, territorial empires and merchant empires. Empires are structured on the basis of two types of hierarchies: "top-down" and "bottom-up" that determine their protection costs. We systematically study the impact of asymmetrical protection costs on price competition in the light of Bertrand equilibria. We provide an economic rationale for the use of violence throughout history in conformity with the findings of economic historians.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoine Pietri & Tarik Tazdait & Mehrdad Vahabi, 2013. "Empire-Building and Price Competition," Post-Print hal-00832236, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00832236
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    Cited by:

    1. Vahabi,Mehrdad, 2019. "The Political Economy of Predation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107591370, January.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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