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Engagement unilatéral spontané en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux

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  • Gilles Rotillon
  • Tarik Tazdaït
  • Sylvain Zeghni
  • Claude Jessua

Abstract

[eng] In this paper which deals with global environmental problems, we use an evo­lutionary approach in order to determine the conditions under which O.E.C.D countries are led to reduce unilaterally their pollution emissions. Thus we remark that a country's choice of a unilateral reduction depends on the information at its disposal concerning the other nations' characteristics. Where such information is complete, the commitment emerges as the result of a strategical calculation. The conclusion seems less obvious in a case of asymmetrical information where eve­rything leads us to believe that the commitment would be bound to fail. [fre] L'objet du présent article consiste à cerner les conditions d'émergence d'un engagement unilatéral de certains pays face aux menaces environnementales globales, à l'image de l'effet de serre ou du trou dans la couche d'ozone. Ce comportement est évoqué sous l'angle de la théorie des jeux évolutionnistes. Ainsi, à l'aide du concept de stratégie évolutionnairement stable, nous montrons qu'en information parfaite l'engagement unilatéral se perpétuera pour entraîner un mouvement étendu, alors qu'en présence d'asymétrie d'information l'engagement unilatéral n'aura lieu que dans des proportions limitées.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilles Rotillon & Tarik Tazdaït & Sylvain Zeghni & Claude Jessua, 1996. "Engagement unilatéral spontané en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(3), pages 601-610.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1996_num_47_3_409796
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1996.409796
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1996.409796
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sylvain Zeghni & Gilles Rotillon & Tarik Tazdait, 1996. "Spontaneous Unilateral Commitment In The Presence Of Global Environmental Change [Engagement unilatéral spontané en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux]," Post-Print hal-01100891, HAL.
    2. Ockenfels, Peter, 1993. "Cooperation in prisoners' dilemma : An evolutionary approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 567-579, November.
    3. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    4. Pierre-André Chiappori, 1984. "Sélection naturelle et rationalité absolue des entreprises," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 35(1), pages 87-108.
    5. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1992. "The international dimension of environmental policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 379-387, April.
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