Games Of Climate Change With International Trade
We analyse games of greenhouse gas emission reduction in which the emissions and the emission reduction costs of one country depend on other countries? emission abatement. In an analytically tractable model, we show that international trade effects on costs and emissions can either increase or decrease incentives to reduce emissions and to cooperate on emission abatement; in some specifications, optimal emission reduction is unaffected by trade. We therefore specify the model further, calibrating it to larger models that estimate the costs of emission reduction, trade effects, and impacts of climate change. If trade affect the total emission reduction costs, but not the marginal emission reduction costs, cooperation is more difficult than in the case without trade effects. If trade affects both marginal and total emission reduction costs, cooperation becomes easier. Carbon leakage does not affect our qualitative insights, although it does change the numbers.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2001|
|Date of revision:||Feb 2001|
|Publication status:||Published, Environmental and Resource Economics, 28, 209-232|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +49 40 42838 6593
Fax: +49 40 42838 7009
Web page: http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991.
"Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
- Copeland, Brian R. & Taylor, M. Scott, 2005.
"Free trade and global warming: a trade theory view of the Kyoto protocol,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 205-234, March.
- Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, 2000. "Free Trade and Global Warming: A Trade Theory View of the Kyoto Protocol," NBER Working Papers 7657, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Copeland,B.R. & Taylor,M.S., 2000. "Free trade and global warming : a trade theory view of the Kyoto protocol," Working papers 4, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Hoel, M., 1993.
"Efficient Climate Policy in the Presence of Free Riders,"
04/1993, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Hoel Michael, 1994. "Efficient Climate Policy in the Presence of Free Riders," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 259-274, November.
- Richard S.J. Tol & Wietze Lise & Benoit Morel & Bob C.C. van der Zwaan, 2001. "Technology Development And Diffusion And Incentives To Abate Greenhouse Gas Emissions," Working Papers FNU-6, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Feb 2001.
- Paul M. Bernstein & W. David Montgomery & Thomas F. Rutherford & Gui-Fang Yang, 1999. "Effects of Restrictions on International Permit Trading: The MS-MRT Model," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I), pages 221-256.
- Ioannidis, Alexis & Papandreou, Andreas & Sartzetakis, Eftichios, 2000. "International Environmental Agreements: a Literature Review," Cahiers de recherche 0008, GREEN.
- John Whalley & Randall Wigle, 1991. "Cutting CO2 Emissions: The Effects of Alternative Policy Approaches," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 109-124.
- Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
- Barrett, Scott, 1997. "The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 345-361, November.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1992. "The international dimension of environmental policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 379-387, April.
- Babiker, Mustafa & Reilly, John M. & Jacoby, Henry D., 2000. "The Kyoto Protocol and developing countries," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(8), pages 525-536, July.
- Bernstein, Paul M. & Montgomery, W. David & Rutherford, Thomas F., 1999. "Global impacts of the Kyoto agreement: results from the MS-MRT model," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 375-413, August.
- Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1995. "R&D Cooperation and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 1154, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Vivek Tulpule & Stephen Brown & Jaekyu Lim & Cain Polidano & Horn Pant & Brian S. Fisher, 1999. "The Kyoto Protocol: An Economic Analysis Using GTEM," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I), pages 257-285.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sgc:wpaper:7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Uwe Schneider)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.