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Technology Development And Diffusion And Incentives To Abate Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Author

Listed:
  • Richard S.J. Tol

    (Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin)

  • Wietze Lise
  • Benoit Morel
  • Bob C.C. van der Zwaan

Abstract

More technology implies higher welfare. Therefore, it is individually rational to cooperate on technological development. It is not individually rational cooperate on greenhouse gas emission reduction. If technology cooperation only comes with cooperation on emission reduction, incentives to free ride on the emission reduction agreement are reduced. However, countries would prefer to cooperate on technology but not on emission reduction. If technology progresses through a learning-by-doing mechanism, more emission reduction technology does not necessarily imply higher emission reduction. However, for reasonable parameter choices, it does. This implies that technological cooperation is an effective instrument in emission reduction policy, also if that policy is of a non-cooperative nature. It also implies that it is in the best interest of technology leaders to subsidise the export of greenhouse gas reducing technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard S.J. Tol & Wietze Lise & Benoit Morel & Bob C.C. van der Zwaan, 2001. "Technology Development And Diffusion And Incentives To Abate Greenhouse Gas Emissions," Working Papers FNU-6, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Feb 2001.
    • Handle: RePEc:sgc:wpaper:6
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    File URL: http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/fileadmin/fnu-files/publication/working-papers/endocoal5.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Richard Tol, 2002. "Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change. Part 1: Benchmark Estimates," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 21(1), pages 47-73, January.
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    6. Marc Germain & Philippe Toint & Henry Tulkens & Aart Zeeuw, 2006. "Transfers to Sustain Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 251-274, Springer.
    7. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Roberto Roson & Richard s.J. Tol, 2003. "An Integrated Assessment Model Of Economy-Energy-Climate – The Model Wiagem: A Comment," Working Papers FNU-26, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2003.
    2. Claudia Kemfert & Wietze Lise & Richard Tol, 2004. "Games of Climate Change with International Trade," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 28(2), pages 209-232, June.
    3. Miyuki Nagashima & Rob Dellink, 2008. "Technology spillovers and stability of international climate coalitions," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 343-365, December.
    4. P. Michael Link, 2003. "Auswirkungen populationsdynamischer Veränderungen in Fischbeständen auf die Fischereiwirtschaft in der Barentssee," Working Papers FNU-29, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2003.
    5. Vaal, Albert de & Yetkiner, I. Hakan & Zon, Adriaan van, 2002. "The cyclical advancement of drastic technologies," CCSO Working Papers 200217, University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research.
    6. I. Hakan Yetkiner, 2003. "Is There An Indispensable Role For Government During Recovery From An Earthquake? A Theoretical Elaboration," Working Papers FNU-25, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Apr 2003.
    7. Timo Goeschl & Grischa Perino, 2017. "The Climate Policy Hold‐Up: Green Technologies, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Abatement Incentives of International Agreements," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(3), pages 709-732, July.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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