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Games of Climate Change with International Trade

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  • Claudia Kemfert
  • Wietze Lise
  • Richard Tol

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Abstract

We analyse games of greenhouse gas emission reduction in which the emissions and the emission reduction costs of one country depend on other countries' emission abatement. In an analytically tractable model, we show that international trade effects on costs and emissions can either increase or decrease incentives to reduce emissions and to cooperate on emission abatement; in some specifications, optimal emission reduction is unaffected by trade. We therefore specify the model further, calibrating it to larger models that estimate the costs of emission reduction, trade effects, and impacts of climate change. If trade effects are driven by total emission reduction costs of other countries cooperation is slightly more difficult than in the case without trade effects. If trade effects are determined by relative emission reduction efforts in other countries, cooperation becomes easier. Carbon leakage does not affect our qualitative insights, although it does change the numbers. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Claudia Kemfert & Wietze Lise & Richard Tol, 2004. "Games of Climate Change with International Trade," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 28(2), pages 209-232, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:28:y:2004:i:2:p:209-232
    DOI: 10.1023/B:EARE.0000029920.33102.10
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    15. Richard S.J. Tol & Wietze Lise & Benoit Morel & Bob C.C. van der Zwaan, 2001. "Technology Development And Diffusion And Incentives To Abate Greenhouse Gas Emissions," Working Papers FNU-6, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Feb 2001.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, W.T. & Li, Y.P. & Huang, G.H. & Chen, X. & Li, Y.F., 2010. "A two-stage inexact-stochastic programming model for planning carbon dioxide emission trading under uncertainty," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 87(3), pages 1033-1047, March.
    2. Vaal, Albert de & Yetkiner, I. Hakan & Zon, Adriaan van, 2002. "The cyclical advancement of drastic technologies," CCSO Working Papers 200217, University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research.
    3. Li, Y.P. & Huang, G.H. & Chen, X., 2011. "Planning regional energy system in association with greenhouse gas mitigation under uncertainty," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 599-611, March.
    4. Satoru Kasahara & Sergey Paltsev & John Reilly & Henry Jacoby & A. Ellerman, 2007. "Climate Change Taxes and Energy Efficiency in Japan," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(2), pages 377-410, June.
    5. Richard S.J. Tol, 2013. "Long live the Kyoto Protocol!," Chapters,in: Handbook on Energy and Climate Change, chapter 14, pages 344-351 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Han, Jee-Hoon & Ahn, Yu-Chan & Lee, In-Beum, 2012. "A multi-objective optimization model for sustainable electricity generation and CO2 mitigation (EGCM) infrastructure design considering economic profit and financial risk," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 186-195.
    7. P. Michael Link, 2003. "Auswirkungen populationsdynamischer Veränderungen in Fischbeständen auf die Fischereiwirtschaft in der Barentssee," Working Papers FNU-29, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2003.
    8. Katrin Rehdanz & Richard S.J. Tol, 2002. "On National and International Trade in Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits," Working Papers FNU-11, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Jan 2003.
    9. Levy, Amnon & Livermore, Jonathon, 2009. "Emission Abatement with Per Capita and Trade Considerations," Economics Working Papers wp09-04, School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia.
    10. Bin Ye & Jingjing Jiang & Lixin Miao & Ji Li & Yang Peng, 2015. "Innovative Carbon Allowance Allocation Policy for the Shenzhen Emission Trading Scheme in China," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 8(1), pages 1-23, December.
    11. I. Hakan Yetkiner, 2003. "Is There An Indispensable Role For Government During Recovery From An Earthquake? A Theoretical Elaboration," Working Papers FNU-25, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Apr 2003.
    12. repec:gam:jsusta:v:8:y:2015:i:1:p:3:d:61052 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Kemfert, Claudia, 2004. "Climate coalitions and international trade: assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 455-465, March.
    14. Roberto Roson & Richard s.J. Tol, 2003. "An Integrated Assessment Model Of Economy-Energy-Climate – The Model Wiagem: A Comment," Working Papers FNU-26, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2003.
    15. Lassi Ahlvik & Yulia Pavlova, 2013. "A Strategic Analysis of Eutrophication Abatement in the Baltic Sea," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(3), pages 353-378, November.
    16. Miyuki Nagashima & Rob Dellink, 2008. "Technology spillovers and stability of international climate coalitions," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 343-365, December.
    17. Li, Y.P. & Huang, G.H. & Li, M.W., 2014. "An integrated optimization modeling approach for planning emission trading and clean-energy development under uncertainty," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 31-46.
    18. Rehdanz, Katrin & Tol, Richard S.J., 2005. "Unilateral regulation of bilateral trade in greenhouse gas emission permits," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 397-416, September.
    19. Kemfert, Claudia & Zhang, ZhongXiang, 2003. "Linking developing country's cooperation on climate control with industrialized country's R&D and technology transfer," MPRA Paper 41473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Chen, C. & Li, Y.P. & Huang, G.H., 2013. "An inexact robust optimization method for supporting carbon dioxide emissions management in regional electric-power systems," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 441-456.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    carbon leakage; climate change; coalition formation; greenhouse gas emission reduction; international trade; optimal emission control;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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