Emission Abatement with Per Capita and Trade Considerations
In the absence of a comprehensive international agreement, each country unilaterally sets her abatement of greenhouse gas emissions at a level that possibly maximizes her expected net benefit. In addition to a cleaner and healthier domestic environment and a slower global warming, a country’s benefit from self emission-abatement may include improved image and, in turn, bilateral economic and political relations. This paper analyses a country’s cooperative and non-cooperative emission abatements within a cost-benefit framework that, for equality consideration, is centered on per capita emission and takes international rewards for commitment to be responsive to per capita income and output composition.
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