Emission Abatement with Per Capita and Trade Considerations
In the absence of a comprehensive international agreement, each country unilaterally sets her abatement of greenhouse gas emissions at a level that possibly maximizes her expected net benefit. In addition to a cleaner and healthier domestic environment and a slower global warming, a country’s benefit from self emission-abatement may include improved image and, in turn, bilateral economic and political relations. This paper analyses a country’s cooperative and non-cooperative emission abatements within a cost-benefit framework that, for equality consideration, is centered on per capita emission and takes international rewards for commitment to be responsive to per capita income and output composition.
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: School of Economics, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, Wollongong NSW 2522 Australia|
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- EYCKMANS, Johan & TULKENS, Henry, 1999.
"Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1999026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Eyckmans, Johan & Tulkens, Henry, 2003. "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 299-327, October.
- Claudia Kemfert & Wietze Lise & Richard Tol, 2004.
"Games of Climate Change with International Trade,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 28(2), pages 209-232, June.
- Barrett, Scott, 1997. "The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 345-361, November.
- Alpay, Savas, 2000. "Does Trade Always Harm the Global Environment? A Case for Positive Interaction," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 272-288, April.
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