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Coalition et accords environnementaux internationaux

  • Tarik Tazdaït
  • Jean-Christophe Péreau
  • Alejandro Caparros

[fre] Qu'ils soient de portée normative ou positive, nombreux sont les travaux s'articulant autour de l'outil théorie des jeux comme mode d'explication de la coopération internationale face aux problèmes environnementaux globaux. En fait, l'analyse théorique des négociations internationales s'est essentiellement développée autour de l'analyse des formes coalitionnelles qui sont susceptibles d'émerger à l'équilibre. Or ce type de réflexions n'est en rien propre aux problèmes environnementaux globaux puisqu'elles sont reprises soit de la théorie des cartels, soit de la théorie des biens publics. Du coup la procédure de négociation se trouve être totalement ignorée, ainsi que des éléments aussi significatifs que l'hétérogénéité des agents, la question de l'équité, ou encore les possibilités de renégociation. Nous nous sommes donc proposés de faire le point des résultats obtenus en procédant par un bilan méthodologique. Cette option a pour but de cerner les qualités et les limites de la conceptualisation retenue, tout en insistant sur des pistes de recherche plausibles. [eng] Abundant literature, both normative and positive, uses game theory tools to study international cooperation on global environmental problems. Theoretical analyses focus mainly on coali- tional forms at the equilibrium. The methodology is in fact derived from either « cartel » theory or « public goods » theory. This is not entirely satisfactory. Indeed, this analytical procedure ignores the negotiation process as well as other significant characteristics of environmental negotiations: heterogeneity, equity, uncertainty or asymmetric information. We propose in this paper to review the main results obtained in the literature by focusing on methodological aspects. This allows us to highlight the pros and cons of each methodological alternative and to point out relevant future research topics.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue française d'économie.

Volume (Year): 18 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 199-232

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Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2003_num_18_2_1488
Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2003.1488
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