Strong Berge and Pareto Equilibrium Existence for a Noncooperative Game
In this paper, we study the main properties of the strong Berge equilibrium which is also a Pareto efficient (SBPE) and the strong Nash equilibrium (SNE). We prove that any SBPE is also a SNE, we prove also existence theorem of SBPE based on the KyFan inequality. Finally, we also provide a method for computing SPBE.
|Date of creation:||05 Dec 2007|
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|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00271464|
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- Le Breton, M. & Konishi, H. & Weber, S., 1995.
"Equivalence of Strong and Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Games without Spillovers,"
95a39, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Michel Le Breton & Hideo Konishi & Shlomo Weber, 1996. "Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 97-113.
- Rabia Nessah & Moussa Larbani & Tarik Tazdait, 2009.
"On Berge Equilibria,"
2010-ECO-16, IESEG School of Management.
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