The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
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Other versions of this item:
- Thomas Demuynck & P. Jean‐Jacques Herings & Riccardo D. Saulle & Christian Seel, 2019. "The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(1), pages 111-138, January.
- Thomas Demuynck & Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo D. Saulle & Christian Seel, 2017. "The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments," Working Papers 2017.26, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Demuynck, Thomas & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Saulle, Riccardo & Seel, Christian, 2017. "The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments," Research Memorandum 002, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Thomas Demuynck & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo D. Saulle & Christian Seel, 2017. "The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments," ETA: Economic Theory and Applications 258008, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
References listed on IDEAS
- Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2017.
"Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 14-19.
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2016. "Stable Sets in Matching Problems with Coalitional Sovereignty and Path Dominance," Research Memorandum 020, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- HERINGS, P. Jean-Jacques & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2016. "Stable Sets in Matching Problems with Coalitional Sovereignty and Path Dominance," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2016010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Lucas, William F., 1992. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.),Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 17, pages 543-590, Elsevier.
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Cited by:
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Saulle, Riccardo & Seel, Christian, 2018. "The Last will be First, and the First Last: Segregation in Societies with Positional Externalities," Research Memorandum 027, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Thomas Demuynck & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo D. Saulle & Christian Seel, 2019.
"Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs: a solution in pure strategies,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(2), pages 147-154, September.
- Demuynck, Thomas & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Saulle, Riccardo D. & Seel, Christian, 2018. "Bertrand Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Solution in Pure Strategies," Research Memorandum 002, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Thomas Demuynck & Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo Saulle & Christian Seel, 2019. "Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs: a solution in pure strategies," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/295316, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Kóczy, László Á., 2020.
"The Equivalence of the Minimal Dominant Set and the Myopic Stable Set for Coalition Function Form Games,"
Research Memorandum
017, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- P. Jean-Jacques Herings & László Á. Kóczy, 2020. "The Equivalence of the Minimal Dominant Set and the Myopic Stable Set for Coalition Function Form Games," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 2022, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Chenghong Luo & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 0. "Network formation with myopic and farsighted players," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 0, pages 1-35.
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Saulle, Riccardo & Seel, Christian, 2020. "The Last will be First, and the First Last: Segregation in Societies with Relative Payoff Concerns (RM/18/027-revised-)," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Agust'in G. Bonifacio & Elena Inarra & Pablo Neme, 2020. "Non-convergence to stability in coalition formation games," Papers 2009.11689, arXiv.org.
More about this item
Keywords
social environments; group formation; stability; Nash equilibrium;JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2017-02-05 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2017-02-05 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2017-02-05 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2017-02-05 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2017-02-05 (Network Economics)
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