The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
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Other versions of this item:
- Thomas Demuynck & Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo D. Saulle & Christian Seel, 2017. "The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments," Working Papers 2017.26, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Demuynck, Thomas & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Saulle, Riccardo & Seel, Christian, 2017. "The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments," Research Memorandum 002, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
References listed on IDEAS
- Lucas, William F., 1992. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 17, pages 543-590 Elsevier.
- Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2017.
"Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 14-19.
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, "undated". "Stable Sets in Matching Problems with Coalitional Sovereignty and Path Dominance," Research Memorandum 020, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- HERINGS, P. Jean-Jacques & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2016. "Stable Sets in Matching Problems with Coalitional Sovereignty and Path Dominance," CORE Discussion Papers 2016010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
More about this item
Keywordssocial environments; group formation; stability; Nash equilibrium;
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-02-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2017-02-05 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2017-02-05 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2017-02-05 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2017-02-05 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2017-02-05 (Network Economics)
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