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Risk-sharing networks and farsighted stability


  • GRANDJEAN, Gilles

    () (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)


Evidence suggests that in developing countries, agents rely on mutual insurance agreements to deal with income or expenditure shocks. This paper analyzes which risk-sharing networks can be sustained in the long run when individuals are far- sighted, in the sense that they are able to forecast how other agents would react to their choice of insurance partners. In particular, we study whether the farsightedness of the agents leads to a reduction of the tension between stability and efficiency that arises when individuals are myopic. We find that for extreme values of the cost of establishing a mutual insurance agreement, myopic and farsighted agents form the same risk-sharing networks. For intermediate costs, farsighted agents form efficient networks while myopic agents don't.

Suggested Citation

  • GRANDJEAN, Gilles, 2011. "Risk-sharing networks and farsighted stability," CORE Discussion Papers 2011014, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2011014

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    More about this item


    risk-sharing; networks; farsighted agents; stability; efficiency;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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