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Économie de la défense

Author

Listed:
  • Renaud Bellais

    (Département SHS - Département Sciences Humaines et Sociales - ENSTA Bretagne - École Nationale Supérieure de Techniques Avancées Bretagne)

  • Martial Foucault

    () (CEVIPOF - Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-Michel Oudot

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

Les tensions internationales récentes soulignent les enjeux et la complexité de la défense. En complément des approches notamment politiques et stratégiques, la science économique contribue à la compréhension de ce domaine. Cet ouvrage offre un panorama de la littérature économique française et internationale à la fois exhaustif et accessible à un large public de non-spécialistes. Après avoir analysé les budgets et l'industrie de défense, il s'intéresse à la commande publique (passation des marchés, clauses contractuelles, conditions d'exécution). Il étudie les déterminants, difficultés et modalités du recrutement des armées ainsi que les externalisations par le recours aux contrats de partenariat et aux sociétés militaires privées. Enfin, l'internationalisation de la défense est analysée sous deux angles : les biens collectifs internationaux (ONU, OTAN...) et le commerce international des armements.

Suggested Citation

  • Renaud Bellais & Martial Foucault & Jean-Michel Oudot, 2014. "Économie de la défense," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01052607, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01052607
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01052607
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    1. Sylvain Moura & Antoine Pietri & Océane Zubeldia, 2019. "Existe-t-il un antagonisme entre défense et environnement ? Eléments de réponse sur l'innovation environnementale dans la BIT," Post-Print halshs-02306962, HAL.

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