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Incentive versus Cost-Plus Contracts in Defense Procurement

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  • Hiller, John R
  • Tollison, Robert D

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  • Hiller, John R & Tollison, Robert D, 1978. "Incentive versus Cost-Plus Contracts in Defense Procurement," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 239-248, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:26:y:1978:i:3:p:239-48
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Glismann, Hans H. & Horn, Ernst-Jürgen & Schrader, Klaus, 1993. "Wohlfahrtseffekte von Rüstungs- und Raumfahrtausgaben: Das Beispiel der Vereinigten Staaten," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 783, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Rajeev Goel, 2001. "R&D effects of incomplete procurement contracts," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(11), pages 697-699.
    3. Kimms, Alf & Fischer, Sven, 1998. "Zahlungsorientierte Gestaltung von Werkverträgen," Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel 467, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre.
    4. Lippman, Steven A. & McCardle, Kevin F. & Tang, Christopher S., 2013. "Using Nash bargaining to design project management contracts under cost uncertainty," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 199-207.
    5. Renaud Bellais & Martial Foucault & Jean-Michel Oudot, 2014. "Économie de la défense," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01052607, HAL.
    6. Richard Higgins & Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "Deregulation redux: does mandating access to bottleneck facilities necessarily improve welfare?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 363-377, March.
    7. Rajeev Goel & Iftekhar Hasan, 2005. "An IT professional’s dilemma: be an entrepreneur or a consultant?," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 17-25, April.
    8. Schrader, Klaus, 1990. "Das militärische Beschaffungswesen in den Vereinigten Staaten," Kiel Working Papers 443, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    9. Kerkhove, L.P. & Vanhoucke, M., 2016. "Incentive contract design for projects: The owner׳s perspective," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 93-114.

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