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Deregulation redux: does mandating access to bottleneck facilities necessarily improve welfare?

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  • Richard Higgins
  • Arijit Mukherjee

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  • Richard Higgins & Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "Deregulation redux: does mandating access to bottleneck facilities necessarily improve welfare?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 363-377, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:142:y:2010:i:3:p:363-377
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9551-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 875-901, December.
    2. Hiller, John R & Tollison, Robert D, 1978. "Incentive versus Cost-Plus Contracts in Defense Procurement," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 239-248, March.
    3. McCormick, Robert E & Shughart, William F, II & Tollison, Robert D, 1984. "The Disinterest in Deregulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 1075-1079, December.
    4. Ebrill, Liam P. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Production efficiency and optimal pricing in intermediate-good regulated industries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 417-442, September.
    5. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    6. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    7. anonymous, 1982. "Communication," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(11), pages 1350-1351, November.
    8. Theodore Keeler, 1984. "Theories of regulation and the deregulation movement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 103-145, January.
    9. anonymous, 1982. "Communications," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(12), pages 1471-1475, December.
    10. anonymous, 1982. "Communication," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 337-337, March.
    11. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    12. Anderson, Gary M & Shughart, William F, II & Tollison, Robert D, 1989. "On the Incentives of Judges to Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 215-228, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2012. "Regulated Input Price, Vertical Separation, and Leadership in Free Entry Markets," ISER Discussion Paper 0853, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deregulation; Asymmetric information; Vertical integration; D82; D86; L43;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

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