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Arijit Mukherjee

Personal Details

First Name:Arijit
Middle Name:
Last Name:Mukherjee
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pmu319
http://www.amukherjee.net
Terminal Degree:2005 Department of Economics; Northwestern University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Economics Department
Michigan State University

East Lansing, Michigan (United States)
http://econ.msu.edu/

: 517.355.7583
517.432.1068
110 Marshall, E. Lansing, MI 48824
RePEc:edi:edmsuus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Vasconcelos, Luis & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2010. "Optimal Job Design In The Presence Of Implicit Contracts," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp551, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.

Articles

  1. Sourav Bhattacharya & Arijit Mukherjee, 2013. "Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(3), pages 522-544, September.
  2. Arijit Mukherjee & Luís Vasconcelos, 2012. "Star Wars: Exclusive Talent and Collusive Outcomes in Labor Markets," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(4), pages 754-782, October.
  3. Maria Goltsman & Arijit Mukherjee, 2011. "Interim Performance Feedback in Multistage Tournaments: The Optimality of Partial Disclosure," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 229-265.
  4. Arijit Mukherjee & Luis Vasconcelos, 2011. "Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(1), pages 44-69, March.
  5. Richard Higgins & Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "Deregulation redux: does mandating access to bottleneck facilities necessarily improve welfare?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 363-377, March.
  6. Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "The optimal disclosure policy when firms offer implicit contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 549-573.
  7. Mukherjee, Arijit & Stern, Scott, 2009. "Disclosure or secrecy? The dynamics of Open Science," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 449-462, May.
  8. Arijit Mukherjee, 2008. "Career Concerns, Matching, And Optimal Disclosure Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1211-1250, November.
  9. Arijit Mukherjee, 2008. "Sustaining implicit contracts when agents have career concerns: the role of information disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 469-490.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Vasconcelos, Luis & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2010. "Optimal Job Design In The Presence Of Implicit Contracts," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp551, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.

    Cited by:

    1. Balmaceda, Felipe, 2016. "Optimal task assignments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 1-18.
    2. Fahn, Matthias & Hakenes, Hendrik, 2017. "Teamwork as a Self-Disciplining Device," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 42, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    3. Joyee Deb & Jin Li & Arijit Mukherjee, 2015. "Relational Contracts with Subjective Peer Evaluations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1995, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2013. "Teams and Tournaments in Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers 2013/13, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    5. Dr Alex Bryson, 2010. "Do Salaries Improve Worker Performance?," National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Discussion Papers 366, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
    6. Vasconcelos, Luis & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2010. "Optimal Job Design In The Presence Of Implicit Contracts," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp551, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
    7. Cici, Gjergji & Hendriock, Mario & Kempf, Alexander, 2018. "The impact of labor mobility restrictions on managerial actions: Evidence from the mutual fund industry," CFR Working Papers 18-01, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    8. Saak, Alexander E., 2016. "Traceability and reputation in supply chains," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 149-162.
    9. Matthias Fahn & Hendrik Hakenes, 2017. "Teamwork as a Self-Disciplining Device," Economics working papers 2017-13, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    10. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2016. "Teams in Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers 2016/23, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    11. Shingo Ishiguro & Yosuke Yasuda, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Target Budgets," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 18-03, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
    12. Katolnik, Svetlana & Hakenes, Hendrik, 2014. "On the Incentive Effect of Job Rotation," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100574, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

Articles

  1. Sourav Bhattacharya & Arijit Mukherjee, 2013. "Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(3), pages 522-544, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Sergiu Hart & Ilan Kremer & Motty Perry, 2015. "Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment," Discussion Paper Series dp684, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    2. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Competing with Equivocal Information," Working Papers hal-00675126, HAL.
    3. Martin Gregor, 2016. "Tullock's Puzzle in Pay-and-Play Lobbying," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 368-389, November.
    4. Newton Jonathan, 2014. "Cheap Talk and Editorial Control," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 1-25, February.
    5. Gregor Martin, 2015. "To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 143-166, July.
    6. Jay Lu & Simon Board, 2015. "Information Provision and Consumer Search," 2015 Meeting Papers 1427, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Luke M. Froeb & Bernhard Ganglmair & Steven Tschantz, 2016. "Adversarial Decision Making: Choosing between Models Constructed by Interested Parties," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 527-548.
    8. Wong, Tsz-Ning & Yang, Lily Ling, 2018. "When does monitoring hurt? Endogenous information acquisition in a game of persuasion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 186-189.
    9. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Receiver's access fee for a single sender," Working Papers IES 2014/17, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised May 2014.
    10. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Access fees for competing lobbies," Working Papers IES 2014/22, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2014.
    11. Claude Fluet und Winand Emons, 2016. "Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs," Diskussionsschriften dp1601, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    12. Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 345-363.

  2. Arijit Mukherjee & Luís Vasconcelos, 2012. "Star Wars: Exclusive Talent and Collusive Outcomes in Labor Markets," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(4), pages 754-782, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Natarajan Balasubramanian & Jin Woo Chang & Mariko Sakakibara & Jagadeesh Sivadasan & Evan Starr, 2017. "Locked In? The Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete and the Careers of High-Tech Workers," Working Papers 17-09, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    2. Suman Ghosh & Kameshwari Shankar, 2017. "Optimal Enforcement Of Noncompete Covenants," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 305-318, January.
    3. Pedro Gonzaga & António Brandão & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2013. "Theory of Collusion in the Labor Market," FEP Working Papers 477, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    4. Wickelgren, Abraham L., 2018. "A novel justification for legal restrictions on non-compete clauses," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 49-57.
    5. Pedro Gonzaga & António Brandão & Helder Vasconcelos, 2014. "Theory of Semi-Collusion in the Labor Market," FEP Working Papers 522, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.

  3. Maria Goltsman & Arijit Mukherjee, 2011. "Interim Performance Feedback in Multistage Tournaments: The Optimality of Partial Disclosure," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 229-265.

    Cited by:

    1. Fu, Qiang & Gürtler, Oliver & Münster, Johannes, 2013. "Communication and commitment in contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 1-19.
    2. Philipp Ager & Leonardo Bursztyn & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2016. "Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II," NBER Working Papers 22992, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Eriksson, Tor & Poulsen, Anders & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2008. "Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 3440, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    4. Yildirim Mustafa, 2018. "Pre-contest Communication Incentives," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-21, January.
    5. Terstiege, Stefan, 2013. "Objective versus Subjective Performance Evaluations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 430, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    6. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur & Arjan Non & Willem Verbeke, 2015. "The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(3), pages 521-569.
    7. Klein, Arnd Heinrich & Schmutzler, Armin, 2014. "Optimal Effort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 10192, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Pepito, Nona, 2011. "Double-edged transparency in teams," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 531-542.
    9. Julia Nafziger & Heiner Schumacher, 2013. "Information Management and Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 140-163, March.
    10. Terstiege, Stefan, 2014. "Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 341-344.
    11. Marino, Anthony M., 2014. "Transparency in agency: The constant elasticity case and extensions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 9-21.
    12. Chen, Bin R., 2015. "Subjective performance feedback, ability attribution, and renegotiation-proof contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 155-174.
    13. Daniel P. Gross, 2016. "Performance Feedback in Competitive Product Development," Harvard Business School Working Papers 16-110, Harvard Business School, revised Oct 2016.
    14. Ján Zábojník, 2014. "Subjective evaluations with performance feedback," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(2), pages 341-369, June.
    15. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur & Arjan Non & Willem Verbeke, 2010. "Dynamic Incentive Effects of Relative Performance Pay: A Field Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-124/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 27 Sep 2011.
    16. Bin R. Chen & Y. Stephen Chiu, 2013. "Interim Performance Evaluation in Contract Design," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123, pages 665-698, June.
    17. Smolin, Alex, 2017. "Dynamic Evaluation Design," MPRA Paper 84133, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Miriam Schütte & Philipp Christoph Wichardt, 2013. "Delegation and Interim Performance Evaluation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4193, CESifo Group Munich.
    19. Qiang Fu & Jingfeng Lu & Yue Pan, 2015. "Team Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2120-2140, July.
    20. Wataru Tamura, 2012. "A Theory of Multidimensional Information Disclosure," ISER Discussion Paper 0828, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    21. Marino, Anthony M. & Ozbas, Oguzhan, 2014. "Disclosure of status in an agency setting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 191-207.
    22. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Grünseis, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in unfair contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    23. Katolnik, Svetlana & Hakenes, Hendrik, 2014. "On the Incentive Effect of Job Rotation," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100574, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

  4. Arijit Mukherjee & Luis Vasconcelos, 2011. "Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(1), pages 44-69, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Richard Higgins & Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "Deregulation redux: does mandating access to bottleneck facilities necessarily improve welfare?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 363-377, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2012. "Regulated Input Price, Vertical Separation, and Leadership in Free Entry Markets," ISER Discussion Paper 0853, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

  6. Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "The optimal disclosure policy when firms offer implicit contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 549-573.

    Cited by:

    1. Nicola Meccheri & Luciano Fanti, 2012. "Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition," Discussion Papers 2012/139, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    2. Dr Alex Bryson, 2010. "Do Salaries Improve Worker Performance?," National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Discussion Papers 366, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.

  7. Mukherjee, Arijit & Stern, Scott, 2009. "Disclosure or secrecy? The dynamics of Open Science," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 449-462, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Ganglmair, Bernhard & Holcomb, Alex & Myung, Noah, 2016. "Cutthroats or comrades: Information sharing among competing fund managers," MPRA Paper 71506, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Czarnitzki, Dirk & Rammer, Christian & Toole, Andrew A., 2013. "University spinoffs and the 'performance premium'," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-004, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    3. Gans, Joshua S. & Murray, Fiona E. & Stern, Scott, 2017. "Contracting over the disclosure of scientific knowledge: Intellectual property and academic publication," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 820-835.
    4. Haeussler, Carolin & Jiang, Lin & Thursby, Jerry & Thursby, Marie, 2014. "Specific and general information sharing among competing academic researchers," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 465-475.
    5. Toole, Andrew A. & King, John L., 2011. "Industry-science connections in agriculture: Do public science collaborations and knowledge flows contribute to firm-level agricultural research productivity?," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-064, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    6. Frank Mueller-Langer & Patrick Andreoli-Versbach, 2014. "Open Access to Research Data: Strategic Delay and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Mandatory Data Disclosure," Working Paper Series of the German Council for Social and Economic Data 239, German Council for Social and Economic Data (RatSWD).
    7. Czarnitzki, Dirk & Grimpe, Christoph & Toole, Andrew A., 2011. "Delay and secrecy: Does industry sponsorship jeopardize disclosure of academic research?," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-009, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    8. Patrick Andreoli-Versbach & Frank Mueller-Langer, 2013. "Open Access to Data: An Ideal Professed but not Practised," Working Paper Series of the German Council for Social and Economic Data 215, German Council for Social and Economic Data (RatSWD).
    9. Thursby, Marie & Thursby, Jerry & Gupta-Mukherjee, Swasti, 2007. "Are there real effects of licensing on academic research? A life cycle view," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(4), pages 577-598, August.
    10. Carolin Haeussler & Lin Jiang & Jerry Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, 2009. "Specific and General Information Sharing Among Academic Scientists," NBER Working Papers 15315, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Boudreau, Kevin J. & Lakhani, Karim R., 2015. "“Open” disclosure of innovations, incentives and follow-on reuse: Theory on processes of cumulative innovation and a field experiment in computational biology," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 4-19.
    12. Mueller-Langer, Frank & Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick, 2018. "Open access to research data: Strategic delay and the ambiguous welfare effects of mandatory data disclosure," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 20-34.
    13. Jeffrey L. Furman & Scott Stern, 2011. "Climbing atop the Shoulders of Giants: The Impact of Institutions on Cumulative Research," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1933-1963, August.
    14. Jong, Simcha & Slavova, Kremena, 2014. "When publications lead to products: The open science conundrum in new product development," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 645-654.
    15. Sascha Friesike & Bastian Widenmayer & Oliver Gassmann & Thomas Schildhauer, 2015. "Opening science: towards an agenda of open science in academia and industry," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 581-601, August.
    16. Nicola Lacetera & Lorenzo Zirulia, 2011. "Individual Preferences, Organization, and Competition in a Model of R&D Incentive Provision," NBER Working Papers 17031, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Marc Blatter & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Informational Hold-Up, Disclosure Policy, and Career Concerns on the Example of Open Source Software Development," Working Papers 08-06, NET Institute, revised Sep 2008.

  8. Arijit Mukherjee, 2008. "Career Concerns, Matching, And Optimal Disclosure Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1211-1250, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2007. "Information and Human Capital Management," Economics Series Working Papers 367, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Pavan, Alessandro & Calzolari, Giacomo, 2009. "Sequential contracting with multiple principals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 503-531, March.
    3. Ján Zábojník, 2012. "Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 213-240, September.
    4. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
    5. Gian Luigi Albano & Clare Leaver, 2005. "Transparency, Recuitment and Retention in the Public Sector," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/132, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    6. Koch, Alexander K. & Peyrache, Eloic, 2005. "Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns," IZA Discussion Papers 1841, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    7. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2011. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 655-688.
    8. Clare Leaver & Gian Luigi Albano, 2004. "Transparency, Recruitment and Retention in the Public Sector," Economics Series Working Papers 219, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    9. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Discussion Papers 1490, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Miriam Schütte & Philipp Christoph Wichardt, 2013. "Delegation and Interim Performance Evaluation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4193, CESifo Group Munich.
    11. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2017. "Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 11869, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "The optimal disclosure policy when firms offer implicit contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 549-573.
    13. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2012. "Firm/Employee Matching: An Industry Study of American Lawyers," NBER Working Papers 18620, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Stephen Eliot Hansen, 2010. "The benefits of limited feedback in organizations," Economics Working Papers 1232, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    15. Stephen Eliot Hansen, 2010. "The Benefits of Limited Feedback in Organizations," Working Papers 490, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    16. Marc Blatter & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Informational Hold-Up, Disclosure Policy, and Career Concerns on the Example of Open Source Software Development," Working Papers 08-06, NET Institute, revised Sep 2008.
    17. Katolnik, Svetlana & Hakenes, Hendrik, 2014. "On the Incentive Effect of Job Rotation," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100574, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

  9. Arijit Mukherjee, 2008. "Sustaining implicit contracts when agents have career concerns: the role of information disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 469-490.

    Cited by:

    1. Koch, Alexander K. & Morgenstern, Albrecht, 2009. "Coordination under the Shadow of Career Concerns," IZA Discussion Papers 4039, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
    3. Braz Camargo & Elena Pastorino, 2016. "Learning-by-Employing: The Value of Commitment under Uncertainty," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(3), pages 581-620.
    4. Evangelia Chalioti, 2015. "Team Production, Endogenous Learning about Abilities and Career Concerns," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2020, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Braz Camargo & Elena Pastorino, 2012. "Learning-by-employing: the value of commitment under uncertainty," Staff Report 475, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    6. James M. Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts," Introductory Chapters,in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.), The Handbook of Organizational Economics Princeton University Press.
    7. Wolitzky Alexander, 2012. "Career Concerns and Performance Reporting in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-32, February.
    8. Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "The optimal disclosure policy when firms offer implicit contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 549-573.
    9. Kim, Doyoung, 2017. "Motivating for new changes when agents have reputation concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 37-53.

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