Politically Imposed Entry Barriers
The antitrust agencies analyze consequences of proposed mergers assuming that imports are constrained by existing quotas, a second-best approach. This policy is flawed. Quotas are endogenous. If a merger allows firms to reduce output, the quota will be increased. If an industry has sufficient political power to obtain subsidies from government then the authorities should assume that these subsidies will be reduced if market power increases. Paradoxically, for political entry barriers truly in the public interest, the antitrust authorities should take the barrier as given. We provide evidence of a large adjustment of tariffs to changes in market power.
Volume (Year): 18 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (Summer)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (201) 684-7346
Web page: http://www.ramapo.edu/eea/journal.html
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
- Noam, Eli, 1984. "Market Power and Regulation: A Simultaneous Approach," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(3), pages 335-47, March.
- William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1975.
"The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective,"
NBER Working Papers
0110, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 875-901, December.
- Hazlett, Thomas W, 1992. "The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-examined," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(2), pages 263-76, April.
- Richard E. Caves, 1976. "Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 9(2), pages 278-300, May.
- Buchanan, James M & Lee, Dwight R, 1992. "Private Interest Support for Efficiency Enhancing Antitrust Policies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(2), pages 218-24, April.
- McKee, Michael & West, Edwin G, 1981. "The Theory of Second Best: A Solution in Search of a Problem," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(3), pages 436-48, July.
- Faith, Roger L & Leavens, Donald R & Tollison, Robert D, 1982. "Antitrust Pork Barrel," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(2), pages 329-42, October.
- Godek, Paul E, 1985. "Industry Structure and Redistribution through Trade Restrictions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 687-703, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:18:y:1992:i:3:p:333-344. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victor Matheson, College of the Holy Cross)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.