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Corruption and Technological Progress: A Takeoff Theory of Good Governance

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  • Evan Osborne

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    Abstract

    Corruption is known to be a function of its return relative to productive activity. But the idea that corruption might itself respond to technological progress has not been emphasized. This paper presents an approach for thinking about institutional features that lower corruption by lowering its relative return. Policies that promote productivity growth in market exchange may cause the relative reward to rent-seeking to decline. The evolutionary development of anti-corruption efforts may be a normal part of modernization, much as changes in income distribution and urbanization. Copyright IAES 2006

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11293-006-9017-y
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    Article provided by Springer & International Atlantic Economic Society in its journal Atlantic Economic Journal.

    Volume (Year): 34 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 3 (September)
    Pages: 289-302

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:34:y:2006:i:3:p:289-302
    DOI: 10.1007/s11293-006-9017-y
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    Keywords: D72; O17;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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    1. Miwa, Yoshiro & Ramseyer, J Mark, 2000. "Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Lessons from the Prewar Japanese Cotton Textile Industry," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 171-203, January.
    2. Barreto, Raul A., 2000. "Endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 35-60, January.
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    7. Peltzman, Sam, 1980. "The Growth of Government," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 209-287, October.
    8. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 875-901, December.
    9. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
    10. Mo, Pak Hung, 2001. "Corruption and Economic Growth," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 66-79, March.
    11. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    12. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    13. Paldam, Martin, 2002. "The cross-country pattern of corruption: economics, culture and the seesaw dynamics," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 215-240, June.
    14. Minh Quang Dao & Hadi S. Esfahani, 1999. "Tests of a competitive model of the size and growth of government," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 26(3), pages 209-220, September.
    15. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bosco, Bruno, 2016. "Old and new factors affecting corruption in Europe: Evidence from panel data," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 66-85.

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