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Corruption and Technological Progress: A Takeoff Theory of Good Governance

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  • Evan Osborne

Abstract

Corruption is known to be a function of its return relative to productive activity. But the idea that corruption might itself respond to technological progress has not been emphasized. This paper presents an approach for thinking about institutional features that lower corruption by lowering its relative return. Policies that promote productivity growth in market exchange may cause the relative reward to rent-seeking to decline. The evolutionary development of anti-corruption efforts may be a normal part of modernization, much as changes in income distribution and urbanization. Copyright IAES 2006

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  • Evan Osborne, 2006. "Corruption and Technological Progress: A Takeoff Theory of Good Governance," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 34(3), pages 289-302, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:34:y:2006:i:3:p:289-302
    DOI: 10.1007/s11293-006-9017-y
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    Cited by:

    1. Bosco, Bruno, 2016. "Old and new factors affecting corruption in Europe: Evidence from panel data," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 66-85.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D72; O17;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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