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The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying

Listed author(s):
  • William R. Kerr

    ()

  • William F. Lincoln

    ()

  • Prachi Mishra

    ()

How is economic policy made? In this paper we study a key determinant of the answer to the question: lobbying by firms. Estimating a binary choice model of firm behavior, we find significant evidence for the idea that barriers to entry induce persistence in lobbying. The existence of these costs is further confirmed in studying how firms responded to a particular policy change: the expiration of legislation relating to the H-1B visa. Due to its in??fluence on firm behavior, we argue that this persistence fundamentally changes the environment in which legislation is made.

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File URL: http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/132971/1/wp1072.pdf
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Paper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number wp1072.

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Length: pages
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2014
Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2014-1072
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