Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process
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Other versions of this item:
- Marianne Bertrand & Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2011. "Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process," NBER Working Papers 16765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
- Timothy Besley & Ian Preston, 2007.
"Electoral Bias and Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 122(4), pages 1473-1510.
- Timothy Besley & Ian Preston, 2006. "Electoral Bias and Policy Choice:Theory and Evidence," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 17, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Tim Besley & Ian Preston, 2007. "Electoral bias and policy choice: theory and evidence," IFS Working Papers W07/06, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Tim Besley & Ian Preston, 2006. "Electoral bias and policy choice: theory and evidence," IFS Working Papers W06/03, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Jordi Blanes i Vidal & Mirko Draca & Christian Fons-Rosen, 2012.
"Revolving Door Lobbyists,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3731-3748, December.
- Blanes i Vidal, Jordi & Draca, Mirko & Fons-Rosen, Christian, 2010. "Revolving door lobbyists," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 31546, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Jordi Blanes i Vidal & Mirko Draca & Christian Fons-Rosen, 2010. "Revolving Door Lobbyists," CEP Discussion Papers dp0993, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 2002. "Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 263-280, June.
More about this item
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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