IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/nbr/nberch/12565.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Antitrust and Regulation

In: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?

Author

Listed:
  • Dennis W. Carlton
  • Randal C. Picker

Abstract

Since the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (1897) and the Sherman Act (1890), regulation and antitrust have operated as competing mechanisms to control competition. Regulation produced cross-subsidies and favors to special interests, but specified prices and rules of mandatory dealing. Antitrust promoted competition without favoring special interests, but couldn't formulate rules for particular industries. The deregulation movement reflected the relative competencies of antitrust and regulation. Antitrust and regulation can also be viewed as complements in which regulation and antitrust assign control of competition to courts and regulatory agencies based on their relative strengths. Antitrust also can act as a constraint on what regulators can do. This paper uses the game-theoretic framework of political bargaining and the historical record of antitrust and regulation to establish and illustrate these points.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, 2014. "Antitrust and Regulation," NBER Chapters,in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, pages 25-61 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:12565
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12565.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniel, Timothy P & Kleit, Andrew N, 1995. "Disentangling Regulatory Policy: The Effects of State Regulations on Trucking Rates," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 267-284, November.
    2. Michael H. Belzer, 1995. "Collective Bargaining after Deregulation: Do the Teamsters Still Count?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 48(4), pages 636-655, July.
    3. Feitler, Jane N. & Corsi, Thomas M. & Grimm, Curtis M., 1997. "Measuring firm strategic change in the regulated and deregulated motor carrier industry: An 18 year evaluation," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 159-169, September.
    4. Davis, David E & Wilson, Wesley W, 1999. "Deregulation, Mergers, and Employment in the Railroad Industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 5-22, January.
    5. Robert S. Pindyck, 2005. "Sunk Costs and Real Options in Antitrust," NBER Working Papers 11430, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1978. "Adjudication as a Private Good," NBER Working Papers 0263, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    8. Morris Fiorina, 1982. "Legislative choice of regulatory forms: Legal process or administrative process?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 33-66, January.
    9. James Peoples, 1998. "Deregulation and the Labor Market," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 111-130, Summer.
    10. Ivaldi, Marc & McCullough, Gerard, 2005. "Welfare Trade-Offs in US Rail Mergers," CEPR Discussion Papers 5000, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Bittlingmayer, George, 1985. "Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 77-118, April.
    12. Moore, Thomas Gale, 1978. "The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 327-343, October.
    13. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    14. Bruce L. Benson & M. L. Greenhut, 1987. "Interest Groups and the Antitrust Paradox," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 6(3), pages 801-817, Winter.
    15. Gilligan, Thomas W & Marshall, William J & Weingast, Barry R, 1989. "Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 35-61, April.
    16. repec:reg:rpubli:237 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Rose, Nancy L, 1987. "Labor Rent Sharing and Regulation: Evidence from the Trucking Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1146-1178, December.
    18. Pirrong, Stephen Craig, 1992. "An Application of Core Theory to the Analysis of Ocean Shipping Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 89-131, April.
    19. Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel & Elisabeth M. Landes, 2004. "The Control of Externalities in Sports Leagues: An Analysis of Restrictions in the National Hockey League," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(S1), pages 268-288, February.
    20. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    21. Dennis W. Carlton, 2001. "A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal - Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided," NBER Working Papers 8105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Christian Jaag & Urs Trinkner, 2011. "A General Framework for Regulation and Liberalization in Network Industries," Chapters,in: International Handbook of Network Industries, chapter 3 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Nishida, Mitsukuni & Gil, Ricard, 2014. "Regulation, enforcement, and entry: Evidence from the Spanish local TV industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 11-23.
    3. Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, 2008. "Appropriate Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct," EAG Discussions Papers 200802, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    4. Dennis W. Carlton, 2010. "Mergers in Regulated Industries: Electricity," Chapters,in: Competition Law and Economics, chapter 9 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Carletti, Elena & Hartmann, Philipp & Ongena, Steven, 2007. "The economic impact of merger control: what is special about banking?," Working Paper Series 786, European Central Bank.
    6. Dennis W. Carlton, 2007. "Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 155-176, Summer.
    7. Joan Ramon Borrell & Juan Luis Jiménez, 2008. "The drivers of antitrust effectiveness," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 185(2), pages 69-88, July.
    8. Wisuttisak, Pornchai, 2012. "Regulation and competition issues in Thai electricity sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 185-198.
    9. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:12565. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.