A General Framework for Regulation and Liberalization in Network Industries
In parallel with liberalization, sector-specific regulation in network industries has become a widely discussed topic among academics, policy makers, industry economists and regulators themselves. The issue of these debates has usually been on whether such regulation is necessary and if so what its optimal design should be. Some argue for complete deregulation (i.e., the complete abolishment of sector-specific regulations), whereas others propose reregulations, that is the replacement of pre-existing (monopoly) regulations by new regulations aiming at safeguarding service levels and competition. The resulting compromise is often somewhere in between; the liberalization process usually entails the partial replacement and realignment of sector-specific regulatory intervention by the disciplining forces of competition protected by competition law. Consequently, competition law and sector-specific regulation play complementary roles. In this paper, we present a general economic framework to assess regulatory remedies in network industries. Therein, liberalization, or more generally market access regulation, can be assessed as well. It provides a foundation and explanation of current sector-specific regulations in place.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in International Handbook Of Network Industries - The Liberalization of Infrastructure, edited by Matthias Finger and Rolf Künneke. Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, pp 26-53.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.swiss-economics.ch|
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pablo T. Spiller, 2009.
"An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications,"
in: Regulation, Deregulation, Reregulation, chapter 3
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Pablo T. Spiller, 2008. "An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications," NBER Working Papers 14152, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mark Armstrong & David Sappington, 2005.
"Regulation, Competition and Liberalization,"
0505011, EconWPA, revised 07 Oct 2005.
- Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, 2014.
"Antitrust and Regulation,"
in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, pages 25-61
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- de Bijl, P.W.J. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Larouche, P., 2005.
"Regulating Access to Stimulate Competition in Postal Markets,"
2005-026, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- de Bijl, P.W.J. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Larouche, P., 2006. "Regulating access to stimulate competition in postal markets?," Other publications TiSEM 21b1fca3-5f00-4ffa-849d-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Matthias Finger & Christian Jaag & Markus Lang & Martin Lutzenberger & Urs Trinkner, 2009. "Bestimmung des Regulierungsbedarfs aus ökonomischer Sicht: Angemessenheit und Folgen einer funktionalen oder strukturellen Trennung von Swisscom," Studies and Reports, Swiss Economics, pages 1-92, February.
- Amihai Glazer & Henry McMillan, 1992. "Pricing by the Firm Under Regulatory Threat," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 1089-1099.
- Bourreau, Marc & Dogan, Pinar, 2001. "Regulation and innovation in the telecommunications industry," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 167-184, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:chc:wpaper:0016. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Jaag)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.