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Sunk Costs and Real Options in Antitrust

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  • Pindyck, Robert S.

Abstract

Sunk costs play a central role in antitrust economics, but are often misunderstood and mismeasured. I will try to clarify some of the conceptual and empirical issues related to sunk costs, and explain their implications for antitrust analysis. I will be particularly concerned with the role of uncertainty. When market conditions evolve unpredictably (as they almost always do), firms incur an opportunity cost when they invest in new capital, because they give up the option to wait for the arrival of new information about the likely returns from the investment. This option value is a sunk cost, and is just as relevant for antitrust analysis as the direct cost of a machine or a factory.

Suggested Citation

  • Pindyck, Robert S., 2005. "Sunk Costs and Real Options in Antitrust," Working papers 18233, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:mit:sloanp:18233
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/18233
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pindyck, Robert S., 1993. "Investments of uncertain cost," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 53-76, August.
    2. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
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    10. Robert S. Pindyck, 2005. "Pricing Capital Under Mandatory Unbundling and Facilities Sharing," NBER Working Papers 11225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, 2014. "Antitrust and Regulation," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, pages 25-61, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Krutilla,Kerry Mace & Good,David Henning & Toman,Michael A. & Arin,Tijen, 2020. "Implementing Precaution in Benefit-Cost Analysis : The Case of Deep Seabed Mining," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9307, The World Bank.
    3. Olender-Skorek, Magdalena, 2012. "To Regulate Or Not to Regulate? – Economic Approach to Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU)," MPRA Paper 48548, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Robert S. Pindyck, 2009. "Sunk Costs and Risk-Based Barriers to Entry," NBER Working Papers 14755, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Xiao, Mo & Orazem, Peter F., 2011. "Does the fourth entrant make any difference?: Entry and competition in the early U.S. broadband market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 547-561, September.
    6. Dennis W. Carlton, 2005. "Barriers To Entry," NBER Working Papers 11645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Jan Vlachý, 2009. "Strategie podniku a finanční teorie [Corporate strategy and financial theory]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2009(2), pages 147-162.
    8. Parton, Lee C. & Dundas, Steven J., 2020. "Fall in the sea, eventually? A green paradox in climate adaptation for coastal housing markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    9. Paul A.Grout & Anna Zalewska, 2006. "Profitability Measures and Competition Law," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 06/144, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    10. Yongma Moon, 2014. "Optimal Time to Invest Energy Storage System under Uncertainty Conditions," Energies, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-19, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sunk costs; real options; investment decisions; antitrust; entry barriers; market power; mergers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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