Regulatory competition and forbearance: Evidence from the life insurance industry
Regulatory separation theory indicates that a system with multiple regulators leads to less forbearance and limits producer gains while a model of banking regulation developed by Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) predicts the opposite. Fragmented regulation of the US life insurance industry provides an especially rich environment for testing the effects of regulatory competition. We find positive relations between regulatory competition and profitability measures for this industry, which is consistent with the Dell'Ariccia and Marquez model. Our results have practical implications for the debate over federal versus state regulation of insurance and financial services in the US.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- J. Tyler Leverty & Martin F. Grace, 2012. "Dupes or Incompetents? An Examination of Management's Impact on Firm Distress," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 79(3), pages 751-783, 09.
- White, Lawrence J, 1994. "On the International Harmonization of Bank Regulation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(4), pages 94-105, Winter.
- Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
- Gardner, Lisa A. & Grace, Martin F., 1993. "X-Efficiency in the US life insurance industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2-3), pages 497-510, April.
- J. David Cummins & Sharon Tennyson & Mary A. Weiss, 1998.
"Consolidation and efficiency in the U.S. life insurance industry,"
98-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Cummins, J. David & Tennyson, Sharon & Weiss, Mary A., 1999. "Consolidation and efficiency in the US life insurance industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(2-4), pages 325-357, February.
- J. David Cummins & Sharon Tennyson & Mary A. Weiss, 1998. "Consolidation and Efficiency in the U.S. Life Insurance Industry," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 98-08, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Stephen T. Ziliak & Deirdre N. McCloskey, 2004. "Size Matters: The Standard Error of Regressions in the American Economic Review," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 1(2), pages 331-358, August.
- Zhao, Tianshu & Casu, Barbara & Ferrari, Alessandra, 2010. "The impact of regulatory reforms on cost structure, ownership and competition in Indian banking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 246-254, January.
- L. Lee Colquitt & David W. Sommer, 2003. "An Exploratory Analysis of Insurer Groups," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 6(2), pages 83-96, 09.
- J. David Cummins & Sharon Tennyson, 1992. "Controlling Automobile Insurance Costs," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 95-115, Spring.
- Edward J. Kane, 1997.
"Ethical Foundations of Financial Regulation,"
NBER Working Papers
6020, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Baltagi, Badi H. & Li, Qi, 1990. "A Comparison of Variance Components Estimators Using Balanced Versus Unbalanced Data," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(02), pages 283-285, June.
- Ziliak, Stephen T. & McCloskey, Deirdre N., 2004. "Size matters: the standard error of regressions in the American Economic Review," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 527-546, November.
- Martin F. Grace & Richard D. Phillips, 2007. "The Allocation of Governmental Regulatory Authority: Federalism and the Case of Insurance Regulation," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(1), pages 207-238.
- Merton, Robert C., 1995.
"Financial innovation and the management and regulation of financial institutions,"
Journal of Banking & Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 461-481, June.
- Robert C. Merton, 1995. "Financial Innovation and the Management and Regulation of Financial Institutions," NBER Working Papers 5096, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- J. A. Hausman, 1976.
"Specification Tests in Econometrics,"
185, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Harry Huizinga & Ga�tan Nicod�me, 2002.
"Deposit insurance and international bank deposits,"
European Economy - Economic Papers
164, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
- Huizinga, Harry & Nicodeme, Gaetan, 2006.
"Deposit insurance and international bank liabilities,"
Journal of Banking & Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 965-987, March.
- Etti Baranoff & Thomas Sager, 2003. "The Relations among Organizational and Distribution Forms and Capital and Asset Risk Structures in the Life Insurance Industry," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 70(3), pages 375-400.
- Acharya, Viral V, 2002.
"Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3253, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Viral V. Acharya, 2003. "Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2745-2782, December.
- David Cummins, J. & Sommer, David W., 1996. "Capital and risk in property-liability insurance markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 1069-1092, July.
- Grace, Martin F. & Phillips, Richard D., 2008. "Regulator performance, regulatory environment and outcomes: An examination of insurance regulator career incentives on state insurance markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 116-133, January.
- Gatzert, Nadine & Schmeiser, Hato, 2008. "Combining fair pricing and capital requirements for non-life insurance companies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(12), pages 2589-2596, December.
- Andre P. Liebenberg & David W. Sommer, 2008. "Effects of Corporate Diversification: Evidence From the Property-Liability Insurance Industry," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 75(4), pages 893-919.
- Danzon, Patricia M & Harrington, Scott E, 2001. "Worker's Compensation Rate Regulation: How Price Controls Increase Costs," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 1-36, April.
- Weiss, Mary A. & Choi, Byeongyong Paul, 2008. "State regulation and the structure, conduct, efficiency and performance of US auto insurers," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 134-156, January.
- Muth, Mary K & et al, 2003. "The Fable of the Bees Revisited: Causes and Consequences of the U.S. Honey Program," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 479-516, October.
- Mayers, David & Smith, Clifford W, Jr, 1988. "Ownership Structure across Lines of Property-Casualty Insurance," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 351-78, October.
- Sam Peltzman, 1976.
"Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,"
NBER Working Papers
0133, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barber, Brad M. & Lyon, John D., 1996. "Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and specification of test statistics," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 359-399, July.
- Mitton, Todd, 2006. "Stock market liberalization and operating performance at the firm level," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 625-647, September.
- Kane, Edward J., 1999. "Implications of superhero metaphors for the issue of banking powers," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(2-4), pages 663-673, February.
- Steven Pottier & David Sommer, 2002. "The Effectiveness of Public and Private Sector Summary Risk Measures in Predicting Insurer Insolvencies," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 101-116, February.
- Xavier Vives, 2001. "Restructuring Financial Regulation in the European Monetary Union," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 57-82, February.
- Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Marquez, Robert, 2006. "Competition among regulators and credit market integration," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 401-430, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:34:y:2010:i:3:p:522-532. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.