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Regulator performance, regulatory environment and outcomes: An examination of insurance regulator career incentives on state insurance markets

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  • Grace, Martin F.
  • Phillips, Richard D.

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  • Grace, Martin F. & Phillips, Richard D., 2008. "Regulator performance, regulatory environment and outcomes: An examination of insurance regulator career incentives on state insurance markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 116-133, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:32:y:2008:i:1:p:116-133
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    1. Richard T. Boylan, 2005. "What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. Attorneys," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 379-402.
    2. Smart, Susan R, 1994. "The Consequences of Appointment Methods and Party Control for Telecommunications Pricing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 301-323, Summer.
    3. Spiller, Pablo T, 1990. "Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed."," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 65-101, April.
    4. Formby, John P & Mishra, Banamber & Thistle, Paul D, 1995. "Public Utility Regulation and Bond Ratings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 84(1-2), pages 119-136, July.
    5. Yeon-Koo Che, 1995. "Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 378-397, Autumn.
    6. Smith, Eric & Wright, Randall, 1992. "Why Is Automobile Insurance in Philadelphia So Damn Expensive?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 756-772, September.
    7. Lee, Lung-Fei, 1983. "Generalized Econometric Models with Selectivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(2), pages 507-512, March.
    8. Eckert, Ross D, 1981. "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissioners," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 113-120, April.
    9. Peltzman, Sam, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-240, August.
    10. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, September.
    11. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1999. "Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 232-262, Summer.
    12. Susan R. Smart, 1994. "The Consequences of Appointment Methods and Party Control for Telecommunications Pricing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 301-323, June.
    13. David J. Salant, 1995. "Behind the Revolving Door: A New View of Public Utility Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 362-377, Autumn.
    14. repec:aei:rpbook:53308 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. McShane, Michael K. & Cox, Larry A. & Butler, Richard J., 2010. "Regulatory competition and forbearance: Evidence from the life insurance industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 522-532, March.
    2. Cole, John A. & Cadogan, Godfrey, 2014. "Bankruptcy risk induced by career concerns of regulators," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 259-271.
    3. Jill Bisco & Kathleen McCullough & Hugo Moises Montesinos Yufa & Eleanor Tice Sirmans, 2023. "The impact of monitor choice on insurer loss reserves," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 26(1), pages 83-105, March.
    4. Martin F. Grace & J. Tyler Leverty, 2010. "Political Cost Incentives for Managing the Property‐Liability Insurer Loss Reserve," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 21-49, March.
    5. Martha Henn McCormick, 2008. "Selected Research on Insurance Regulatory Reform: A Descriptive Bibliography," NFI Reports 2008-NFI-02, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute, revised Feb 2009.
    6. Alexander Whalley, 2013. "Elected versus Appointed Policy Makers: Evidence from City Treasurers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(1), pages 39-81.
    7. Gaganis, Chrysovalantis & Hasan, Iftekhar & Pasiouras, Fotios, 2016. "Regulations, institutions and income smoothing by managing technical reserves: International evidence from the insurance industry," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 59(PA), pages 113-129.
    8. Gaganis, Chrysovalantis & Hasan, Iftekhar & Pasiouras, Fotios, 2020. "Cross-country evidence on the relationship between regulations and the development of the life insurance sector," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 256-272.
    9. Jeungbo Shim, 2023. "Are mergers and acquisitions beneficial to consumers? Evidence from the property‐liability insurance industry," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 629-652, August.
    10. Pasiouras, Fotios & Gaganis, Chrysovalantis, 2013. "Regulations and soundness of insurance firms: International evidence," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 66(5), pages 632-642.
    11. Gaganis, Chrysovalantis & Liu, Liuling & Pasiouras, Fotios, 2015. "Regulations, profitability, and risk-adjusted returns of European insurers: An empirical investigation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 18(C), pages 55-77.
    12. repec:bof:bofrdp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201508181354 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Jeungbo Shim, 2017. "An Investigation Of Market Concentration And Financial Stability In Property–Liability Insurance Industry," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(2), pages 567-597, June.
    14. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2015_015 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. repec:zbw:bofrdp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201508181354 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Leverty, J. Tyler & Grace, Martin F., 2018. "Do elections delay regulatory action?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 409-427.
    17. Mehmet I. Canayaz & Jose V. Martinez & Han N. Ozsoylev, 2015. "Is the revolving door of Washington a back door to excess corporate returns?," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1507, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    18. Schlütter, Sebastian, 2011. "Capital requirements or pricing constraints? An economic analysis of measures for insurance regulation," ICIR Working Paper Series 03/11, Goethe University Frankfurt, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR).
    19. Jivas Chakravarthy & Katie E. McDermott & Roger M. White, 2021. "Are Regulators Effective at Unraveling Accounting Manipulation? Evidence from Public Utility Commissions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(7), pages 4532-4555, July.

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