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Revolving door laws and state public utility commissioners

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  • Marc T. Law
  • Cheryl X. Long

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of revolving door regulations – laws that restrict the post‐government employment opportunities of public sector workers – on the characteristics of state public utility commissioners. We find that commissioners from states with revolving door regulations have less expertise, serve shorter terms, and are less likely to be subsequently employed by the private sector, compared with their counterparts from states without revolving door laws. These findings suggest that revolving door regulations may have costly unintended consequences.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc T. Law & Cheryl X. Long, 2011. "Revolving door laws and state public utility commissioners," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(4), pages 405-424, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:5:y:2011:i:4:p:405-424
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2011.01119.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Heyes, Anthony G, 2003. "Expert Advice and Regulatory Complexity," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 119-133, September.
    2. Troy Quast, 2008. "Do elected public utility commissioners behave more politically than appointed ones?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 318-337, June.
    3. Fields, Joseph A & Klein, Linda S & Sfiridis, James M, 1997. "A Market Based Evaluation of the Election versus Appointment of Regulatory Commissioners," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(3-4), pages 337-351, September.
    4. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    5. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, September.
    6. Hilton, George W, 1972. "The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commissions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 47-54, May.
    7. Marc T. Law & Cheryl X. Long, 2012. "What Do Revolving-Door Laws Do?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(2), pages 421-436.
    8. Boylan, Richard T & Long, Cheryl X, 2005. "Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 627-651, October.
    9. Yeon-Koo Che, 1995. "Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 378-397, Autumn.
    10. Peter Navarro, 1982. "Public Utility Commission Regulation: Performance, Determinants, and Energy Policy Impacts," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 119-140.
    11. Marc T. Law, 2006. "How do Regulators Regulate? Enforcement of the Pure Food and Drugs Act, 1907--38," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 459-489, October.
    12. Peter Navarro, 1982. "Public Utility Commission Regulation: Performance, Determinants, and Energy Policy Impacts," The Energy Journal, , vol. 3(2), pages 119-140, April.
    13. David J. Salant, 1995. "Behind the Revolving Door: A New View of Public Utility Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 362-377, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hartlapp, Miriam & Lorenz, Yann, 2012. "Persönliche Merkmale von Führungspersonal als Politikdeterminante: Die Europäische Kommission im Wandel der Zeit," Discussion Papers, Schumpeter Junior Research Group Position Formation in the EU Commission SP IV 2012-501, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    2. Alketa Peci & Aline de Menezes Santos & Bruno César Pino Oliveira de Araújo, 2022. "Quo Vadis? Career paths of Brazilian regulators," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(2), pages 470-486, April.

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