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Quo Vadis? Career paths of Brazilian regulators

Author

Listed:
  • Alketa Peci
  • Aline de Menezes Santos
  • Bruno César Pino Oliveira de Araújo

Abstract

Research about professional trajectories of regulators highlights the exchange of personnel from independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) to the private sector, mainly based on US evidence. However, current studies indicate that revolving doors in different contexts may share more nuances, reflecting the role of different political institutions. Here we rely on sequence analysis to explore the trajectories of 117 Brazilian board members of IRAs, investigating: What are their typical professional trajectories? Which career path receives most of the benefits in postterm positions? The analysis uncovers five clusters of career paths in which most regulators do not transition between the public and private sectors but still benefit in direct and indirect ways from serving terms in IRAs. A different mix of market/bureaucratic/political incentives plays a role in the patterns of professional trajectories we uncover in Brazil. Depending on the context, regulators' trajectories might be driven by either market or state forces.

Suggested Citation

  • Alketa Peci & Aline de Menezes Santos & Bruno César Pino Oliveira de Araújo, 2022. "Quo Vadis? Career paths of Brazilian regulators," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(2), pages 470-486, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:16:y:2022:i:2:p:470-486
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12348
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    References listed on IDEAS

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