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The Cost of Regulatory Compliance in the United States

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  • Trebbi, Francesco
  • Zhang, Miao Ben

Abstract

We quantify firms’ compliance costs of regulation from 2002 to 2014 in terms of their labor input expenditure to comply with government rules, a primary component of regulatory compliance spending for large portions of the U.S. economy. Detailed establishment-level occupation data, in combination with occupation-specific task information, allow us to recover the share of an establishment’s wage bill owing to employees engaged in regulatory compliance. Regulatory costs account on average for 1.34 percent of the total wage bill of a firm, but vary substantially across and within industries, and have increased over time. We investigate the returns to scale in regulatory compliance and find an inverted-U shape, with the percentage regulatory spending peaking for an establishment size of around 500 employees. Finally, we develop an instrumental variable methodology for decoupling the role of regulatory requirements from that of enforcement in driving firms’ compliance costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Trebbi, Francesco & Zhang, Miao Ben, 2023. "The Cost of Regulatory Compliance in the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 17814, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17814
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    2. Charoenwong, Ben & Kowaleski, Zachary T. & Kwan, Alan & Sutherland, Andrew G., 2024. "RegTech: Technology-driven compliance and its effects on profitability, operations, and market structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    3. Armstrong, Daphne M. & Glaeser, Stephen & Hoopes, Jeffrey L., 2025. "Measuring firm exposure to government agencies," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1).
    4. Danuta Dziawgo & Ewa Makowska, 2025. "Regulations Concerning Capital Market from Individual Investors Perspective," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(1), pages 966-978.
    5. Michelle Lowry, 2024. "The questions being asked: Academic research, the media, and regulators," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 59(3), pages 549-560, August.
    6. Dirk Niepelt, 2024. "Money and Banking with Reserves and CBDC," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 79(4), pages 2505-2552, August.
    7. Cong Gian & Sumedha Gupta & Kosali Simon & Ryan Sullivan & Coady Wing, 2024. "Do workers undervalue COVID-19 risk? Evidence from wages and death certificate data," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 69(3), pages 281-321, December.
    8. Cailin Slattery & Ariell Reshef, 2025. "Legislation, Regulation, and Litigation: Demand for US Legal Services in Historical Perspective," EconPol Forum, CESifo, vol. 26(02), pages 62-67, April.
    9. Noailly, Joëlle & Nowzohour, Laura & van den Heuvel, Matthias & Pla, Ireneu, 2024. "Heard the news? Environmental policy and clean investments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).
    10. Galiani, Sebastian & Paz y Miño, Jose Manuel & Torrens, Gustavo, 2025. "Geopolitics and international trade infrastructure deterrence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • P0 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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