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Geopolitics and international trade infrastructure deterrence

Author

Listed:
  • Galiani, Sebastian
  • Paz y Miño, Jose Manuel
  • Torrens, Gustavo

Abstract

We develop a simple (incumbent versus entrant) strategic deterrence model to study the economic and geopolitical interactions underlying a strategic international activity, such as trade-related infrastructure projects like the Panama Canal. We study the incentives for global geopolitical players to support allied satellite countries where the strategic activity takes place or could potentially be initiated. We show that even if no effective competitor emerges, the appearance of a geopolitical challenger capable of credibly supporting the entrant has a pro-competition economic effect which benefits consumers all over the world. Thus, we provide a mechanism through which geopolitical rivalry between global powers leads to better economic outcomes for the global economy (i.e., less market power in the provision of international trade-related infrastructure). This contrasts with previous research on politics and market power which emphasizes the negative effects of political interference as well as research on international relations which often highlights the negative global effects of rising geopolitical tensions between an established power and a emerging challenger.

Suggested Citation

  • Galiani, Sebastian & Paz y Miño, Jose Manuel & Torrens, Gustavo, 2025. "Geopolitics and international trade infrastructure deterrence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:234:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125001167
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106996
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Geopolitical rivalry; Geopolitics; Market power; Deterrence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy

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