Limit-Pricing and Learning-By-Doing: A Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information
We study a firm's pricing/output strategy under threat of entry in a two-period game with asymmetric information, where the firm can reduce future cost through learning-by-doing. In contrast with previous literature, we show that a firm's incentive to reduce cost through higher production may not align with its incentive to signal its cost type. As a consequence, in equilibrium, the incumbent firm might distort its price upward instead of downward.
Volume (Year): 9 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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"The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence,"
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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