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Evaluate the Effectiveness of Manager Compensation


  • Cheng-Feng Cheng

    (Department of International Business, Asia University, Taiwan)


This study develops a conceptual model for compensation from firm and manager perspectives. We identify the negotiating range for a compensation plan and adopt a dynamic bargaining game to optimize the equilibrium of base salary and bonus.

Suggested Citation

  • Cheng-Feng Cheng, 2012. "Evaluate the Effectiveness of Manager Compensation," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 11(1), pages 25-44, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:11:y:2012:i:1:p:25-44

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Giummo, Jesse, 2010. "German employee inventors' compensation records: A window into the returns to patented inventions," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 969-984, September.
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    More about this item


    game theory; optimization; compensation; negotiation; risk analysis;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation


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