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The Political Economy of the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States

Author

Listed:
  • Filippo Lancieri
  • Eric A. Posner
  • Luigi Zingales

Abstract

Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. Building on several new datasets, we argue that this decline did not reflect a popular demand for weaker enforcement or any other kind of democratic sanction. The decline was engineered by unelected regulators and judges who, with a few exceptions, did not express skepticism about antitrust law in confirmation hearings. We find little evidence that academic ideas played an important role in the decline of antitrust enforcement except where they coincided with the interests of big business, which appears to have exercised influence behind the scenes.

Suggested Citation

  • Filippo Lancieri & Eric A. Posner & Luigi Zingales, 2022. "The Political Economy of the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States," NBER Working Papers 30326, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30326
    Note: POL
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Trebbi & Miao Ben Zhang, 2022. "The Cost of Regulatory Compliance in the United States," NBER Working Papers 30691, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Olimpia Cutinelli Rendina, 2023. "Lobbying or Innovation: Who Does What Against Foreign Competition," Working Papers halshs-03970033, HAL.
    3. Christian Reiner & Christian Bellak, 2023. "Hat die ökonomische Macht von Unternehmen in Österreich zugenommen? Teil 1," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 49(1), pages 21-59.
    4. Olimpia Cutinelli Rendina, 2023. "Lobbying or Innovation: Who Does What Against Foreign Competition," PSE Working Papers halshs-03970033, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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