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Structural Presumptions for Non-horizontal Mergers in the 2023 Merger Guidelines: A Primer and a Path Forward

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Listed:
  • Javier D. Donna

    (University of Florida
    Rimini Center for Economic Analysis)

  • Pedro Pereira

    (Autoridade da Concorrência)

Abstract

The 2023 Merger Guidelines (MGs) change the Agencies’ narrative regarding non-horizontal mergers. They follow a four-pronged approach: (1) They blend horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. (2) They simplify the narrative about non-horizontal mergers. (3) They consolidate and broaden the theories of harm in non-horizontal mergers. (4) They blend economics and law analysis. In this article, we elaborate on these points. We discuss how the MGs’ anticompetitive presumptions apply to non-horizontal mergers, relate them to the economics literature, and provide examples. We finish discussing the economic rationale of the structural presumption involving rivals’ exit concerns due to the exercise of market power and propose a path forward.

Suggested Citation

  • Javier D. Donna & Pedro Pereira, 2024. "Structural Presumptions for Non-horizontal Mergers in the 2023 Merger Guidelines: A Primer and a Path Forward," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(1), pages 303-345, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:65:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s11151-024-09971-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-09971-z
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    1. Lancieri, Filippo Maria & Valleti, Tommaso, 2024. "Towards an effective merger review policy: A defence of rebuttable structural presumptions," Working Papers 345, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antitrust; 2023 Merger guidelines; Vertical mergers; Rivals’ exit; Double marginalization; Merger evaluation; Competition policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods

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