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Coordinated Capacity Reductions and Public Communication in the Airline Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Gaurab Aryal
  • Federico Ciliberto
  • Benjamin T Leyden

Abstract

We investigate the allegation that legacy US airlines communicated via earnings calls to coordinate with other legacy airlines in offering fewer seats on competitive routes. To this end, we first use text analytics to build a novel dataset on communication among airlines about their capacity choices. Estimates from our preferred specification show that the number of offered seats is 2 lower when all legacy airlines in a market discuss the concept of “capacity discipline.” We verify that this reduction materializes only when legacy airlines communicate concurrently, and that it cannot be explained by other possibilities, including that airlines are simply announcing to investors their unilateral plans to reduce capacity, and then following through on those announcements.

Suggested Citation

  • Gaurab Aryal & Federico Ciliberto & Benjamin T Leyden, 2022. "Coordinated Capacity Reductions and Public Communication in the Airline Industry," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(6), pages 3055-3084.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:89:y:2022:i:6:p:3055-3084.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdab100
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    Cited by:

    1. Suzie Grondin & Arthur Charpentier & Philipp Ratz, 2025. "Beyond Human Intervention: Algorithmic Collusion through Multi-Agent Learning Strategies," Papers 2501.16935, arXiv.org.
    2. Awaya, Yu & Krishna, Vijay, 2019. "Communication and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    3. Friedrichsen, Jana, 2023. "Preise absprechen: Die Rolle der Kommunikation bei Kartellen und ihrer Verfolgung," WZB-Mitteilungen: Quartalsheft für Sozialforschung, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, issue 181 (3/23, pages 23-27.
    4. Tomaso Duso & Joseph E., Jr. Harrington & Carl Kreuzberg & Geza Sapi, 2025. "Public Communication and Collusion: New Screening Tools for Competition Authorities," CESifo Working Paper Series 12029, CESifo.
    5. Jeremy Bertomeu & John Harry Evans & Mei Feng & Ayung Tseng, 2021. "Tacit Collusion and Voluntary Disclosure: Theory and Evidence from the U.S. Automotive Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 1851-1875, March.
    6. Brown, David P. & Cajueiro, Daniel O. & Eckert, Andrew & Silveira, Douglas, 2025. "Evaluating the role of information disclosure on bidding behavior in wholesale electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    7. Aaron Barkley & David P. Byrne & Xiaosong Wu, 2022. "Price effects of calling out market power: A study of the COVID‐19 oil price shock," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 923-941, November.
    8. Thomas Bourveau & Guoman She & Alminas Žaldokas, 2020. "Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 58(2), pages 295-332, May.
    9. Javier D. Donna & Pedro Pereira, 2024. "Structural Presumptions for Non-horizontal Mergers in the 2023 Merger Guidelines: A Primer and a Path Forward," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(1), pages 303-345, August.
    10. Lysle Boller & Fiona Scott Morton, 2020. "Testing the Theory of Common Stock Ownership," NBER Working Papers 27515, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Qiwen Sheng & Tomislav Vukina, 2024. "Public Communication as a Mechanism for Collusion in the Broiler Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 64(1), pages 57-91, February.
    12. Tomaso Duso & Joseph E. Harrington Jr. & Carl Kreuzberg & Geza Sapi, 2025. "Public Communication and Collusion: New Screening Tools for Competition Authorities," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 2131, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    13. Duso, Tomaso & Harrington, Joseph E. & Kreuzberg, Carl & Sapi, Geza, 2025. "Public communication and collusion: New screening tools for competition authorities," DICE Discussion Papers 430, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    14. Brown, David P. & Eckert, Andrew & Silveira, Douglas, 2023. "Screening for collusion in wholesale electricity markets: A literature review," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation

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