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Do Elected Public Utility Commissioners Behave More Politically than Appointed Ones?

Author

Listed:
  • Troy Quast

    (Department of Economics and International Business, Sam Houston State University)

Abstract

This paper investigates whether the means by which public utility commissioners are selected affects the influence of political affiliation on policy choices. This question is asked in the context of telecommunications network lease prices and retail prices. While political affiliation appears to have limited influence on lease prices set by appointed commissioners, it has a significant impact when these prices are set by elected commissioners. Conversely, the political affiliation of appointed regulators appears to affect retail prices, whereas the political affiliation of elected commissioners does not.

Suggested Citation

  • Troy Quast, 2006. "Do Elected Public Utility Commissioners Behave More Politically than Appointed Ones?," Working Papers 0603, Sam Houston State University, Department of Economics and International Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:shs:wpaper:0603
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    File URL: http://www.shsu.edu/academics/economics-and-international-business/documents/wp_series/wp06-03.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Marc T. Law & Cheryl X. Long, 2011. "Revolving door laws and state public utility commissioners," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(4), pages 405-424, December.
    2. Flavio M. Menezes & Christian Roessler, 2010. "Good and Bad Consistency in Regulatory Decisions," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 86(275), pages 504-516, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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