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The drivers of antitrust effectiveness

Author

Listed:
  • Joan Ramon Borrell

    () (Universitat de Barcelona)

  • Juan Luis Jiménez

    () (Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria)

Abstract

This paper shows what drivers the effectiveness of antitrust policy, by using internationally collated data on the perception of effectiveness of competition policy. It concludes that average antitrust effectiveness depends on per capita income and supranational policy leadership, such as the one at the core of the EU. Additionally, it shows that some aspects of competition policy design have a significant impact on policy results. Effectiveness is driven by using an economic approach to judge dominance and abusive practices. We show that antitrust is sounder when the legal mandate on merger policy focuses on competition in markets, rather than on more broadly defined public interests. Antitrust effectiveness is also spurred by taking an active stance against cartels and especially by introducing a leniency programme to enforce the prohibition of cartels. Finally, it is important that an independent antitrust authority has the final say on prohibiting competition restrains.

Suggested Citation

  • Joan Ramon Borrell & Juan Luis Jiménez, 2008. "The drivers of antitrust effectiveness," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 185(2), pages 69-88, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2008:v:185:i:2:p:69-88
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:oup:jcomle:v:10:y:2014:i:1:p:107-136. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Trujillo, Lourdes & González, María Manuela & Jiménez, Juan Luis, 2013. "An overview on the reform process of African ports," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 12-22.
    3. Catarina Marvão, 2016. "The EU Leniency Programme and Recidivism," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 48(1), pages 1-27, February.
    4. Joan-Ramon Borrell & Juan Luis Jiménez & Carmen García, 2014. "Evaluating Antitrust Leniency Programs," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 107-136.
    5. Marvão, Catarina, 2014. "Heterogeneous Penalties and Private Information," Konkurrensverket Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 2014:1, Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority).
    6. Marvao, Catarina, 2014. "Heterogeneous Penalties and Private Information," SITE Working Paper Series 29, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
    7. Tebbe, Eva & von Blanckenburg, Korbinian, 2017. "Once bitten, twice shy? On the impact of market size and moderate leniency on cartelization and hysteresis effects," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168304, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Juan Jiménez & Jordi Perdiguero, 2012. "Does Rigidity of Prices Hide Collusion?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(3), pages 223-248, November.
    9. Michael, Bryane, 2017. "The Effect of Competition Law on Brunei’s Small and Medium Enterprises," EconStor Preprints 169114, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • O4 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity

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