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Political allocation of US agriculture disaster payments in the 1990s

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  • Garrett, Thomas A.
  • Marsh, Thomas L.
  • Marshall, Maria I.

Abstract

Legislation passed during the 1990s attempted to move U.S. agriculture disaster relief to a more market oriented process. The failure of this legislation has been attributed to the political system behind agricultural disaster relief. This paper explores the impact of political influence on the allocation of U.S. direct agriculture disaster payments. The results reveal that disaster payments are not based solely on need, but are higher in those states represented by public officials key to the allocation of relief. The effectiveness of legislation aimed at promoting more efficient disaster payments systems, such as crop insurance, over direct cash payments is also examined.
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  • Garrett, Thomas A. & Marsh, Thomas L. & Marshall, Maria I., 2006. "Political allocation of US agriculture disaster payments in the 1990s," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 143-161, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:26:y:2006:i:2:p:143-161
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    Cited by:

    1. Stuart Kasdin & Luona Lin, 2015. "Strategic behavior by federal agencies in the allocation of public resources," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 309-329, September.
    2. Joshua Hall & Amanda Ross & Christopher Yencha, 2015. "The political economy of the Essential Air Service program," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 147-164, October.
    3. Kirwan, Barrett E., 2017. "The Benefits of Crop Insurance," 2017 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 1, Chicago, Illinois 259162, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    4. Mingtao Ding & Fangqiang Wei & Kaiheng Hu, 2012. "Property insurance against debris-flow disasters based on risk assessment and the principal–agent theory," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 60(3), pages 801-817, February.
    5. Matt E. Ryan, 2014. "Allocating Infection: The Political Economy Of The Swine Flu (H1n1) Vaccine," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 138-154, January.
    6. Bilotkach, Volodymyr, 2018. "Political economy of infrastructure investment: Evidence from the economic stimulus airport grants," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 27-35.
    7. Tatyana Deryugina & Barrett Kirwan, 2018. "Does The Samaritan'S Dilemma Matter? Evidence From U.S. Agriculture," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 983-1006, April.
    8. Scott Callahan, 2018. "Agricultural Disaster Payments: Are They Still Politically Allocated?," Working Papers 18-14, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    9. Klomp, Jeroen, 2019. "Does government ideology shake or shape the public finances? Empirical evidence of disaster assistance," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 118-127.
    10. Denis Nadolnyak & Valentina Hartarska, 2012. "Agricultural disaster payments in the southeastern US: do weather and climate variability matter?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(33), pages 4331-4342, November.
    11. Nadolnyak, Denis A. & Novak, James L., 2008. "Determinants of Agricultural Disaster Payments in the Southeastern U.S.: County Level Analysis," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6554, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    12. Schoengold, Karina & Ding, Ya & Headlee, Russell, 2012. "The Impact of Ad-hoc Disaster Programs on the Use of Conservation Practices," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124957, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    13. Klomp, Jeroen & Hoogezand, Barry, 2018. "Natural disasters and agricultural protection: A panel data analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 404-417.
    14. Nadolnyak, Denis A., 2008. "Determinants of Agricultural Disaster Payments in the Southeastern U.S.: County Level Analysis," 2008 Annual Meeting, February 2-6, 2008, Dallas, Texas 6733, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.

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