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Agricultural Disaster Payments: Are They Still Politically Allocated?

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  • Scott Callahan

Abstract

This paper studies the allocation of agricultural disaster subsidies. Exploiting a regime change in agricultural disaster policy which occurred with the passage of the 2008 Farm Bill, disaster subsidy disbursement under both the 2005-2007 Crop Disaster Program and the SURE program that ran from 2008-2014 are estimated, and the effects of political factors on subsidy disbursement are compared. Results indicate that the transition from ad-hoc emergency disaster programs to a permanent agricultural disaster program did not reduce the political allocation of agricultural disaster subsidies, in contrast to results from the FEMA disaster payment literature. Key Words: Agricultural Policy, Campaign Finance, Lobbying, Rent Seeking

Suggested Citation

  • Scott Callahan, 2018. "Agricultural Disaster Payments: Are They Still Politically Allocated?," Working Papers 18-14, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
  • Handle: RePEc:apl:wpaper:18-14
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    File URL: http://econ.appstate.edu/RePEc/pdf/wp1814.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Karina Schoengold & Ya Ding & Russell Headlee, 2015. "The Impact of AD HOC Disaster and Crop Insurance Programs on the Use of Risk-Reducing Conservation Tillage Practices," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 97(3), pages 897-919.
    2. Vincent H. Smith & Barry K. Goodwin, 1995. "The Economics of Crop Insurance and Disaster Aid," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 53374, September.
    3. Thomas A. Garrett & Russell S. Sobel, 2003. "The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(3), pages 496-509, July.
    4. Barry K. Goodwin & Ligia A. Vado, 2007. "Public Responses to Agricultural Disasters: Rethinking the Role of Government," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 55(4), pages 399-417, December.
    5. Goodwin, Barry K. & Rejesus, Roderick M., 2008. "Safety Nets or Trampolines? Federal Crop Insurance, Disaster Assistance, and the Farm Bill," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(2), pages 415-429, August.
    6. Garrett, Thomas A. & Marsh, Thomas L. & Marshall, Maria I., 2006. "Political allocation of US agriculture disaster payments in the 1990s," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 143-161, June.
    7. Amemiya, Takeshi, 1984. "Tobit models: A survey," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 3-61.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    agricultural policy; campaign finance; lobbying; rent seeking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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