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Influence of farm size and insured type on crop insurance returns

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  • Sankalp Sharma
  • Cory G. Walters

Abstract

In this article, we empirically examine the impact of farm size and insured type on returns from crop insurance participation in four regions using unit‐level crop insurance contract data. Our quasi‐panel empirical model provides guidance on whether larger producers are riskier than smaller producers and whether cash producers are riskier than landlords. In our sample, we did not find evidence that large producers obtain higher returns from insurance participation than their smaller counterparts. In fact, we found evidence of the opposite that larger producers in Iowa and Nebraska receive less than their smaller counterparts. Our farm size results suggest that any legislation limiting crop insurance participation from large producers would negatively influence the insurance pool, driving up premiums and consequently administrative and operational subsidies and per‐acre premium subsidy dollars. We did find evidence that cash insured types get more back in insurance than landlords in both Montana and Oklahoma, suggesting the possibility of moral hazard in input usage. Our results also highlight spatial differences in crop insurance outcomes.

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  • Sankalp Sharma & Cory G. Walters, 2020. "Influence of farm size and insured type on crop insurance returns," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(3), pages 440-452, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:agribz:v:36:y:2020:i:3:p:440-452
    DOI: 10.1002/agr.21636
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jianru Fu & Ruiyuan Shen & Chao Huang, 2023. "How does price insurance alleviate the fluctuation of agricultural product market? A dynamic analysis based on cobweb model," Agricultural Economics, Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, vol. 69(5), pages 202-211.

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