IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v168y2016i3d10.1007_s11127-016-0358-z.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

NIH biomedical funding: evidence of executive dominance in swing-voter states during presidential elections

Author

Listed:
  • Alberto Batinti

    () (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (SUFE))

Abstract

Abstract This paper explores the role of presidential politics in influencing the distribution of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding. In particular, it investigates how the distribution of NIH funding is stirred towards institutions located in swing-voter US states during presidential elections. In doing so, it fills a gap left in the literature on the political economy of the NIH, which previously focused on the role of membership in the Committees on Appropriations in both chambers of the US Congress. First, it is found that NIH funded performers in states where the Presidential Electoral Importance (PEI) increases by 1 %, receive, on average 0.7–0.8 % more funding. Second, this effect is robust to three additional checks. Third, I run heterogeneity tests, where the direction and change of the elasticity coefficient fit plausible assumptions on the mechanism of presidential influence on NIH funding in swing-voter states. I finally estimate, that the average lower bound of the overall impact of PEI on the NIH budget is between 2 and 3 %. It reaches a maximum of 10 % for specific states, fiscal years, and presidential mandates.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Batinti, 2016. "NIH biomedical funding: evidence of executive dominance in swing-voter states during presidential elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 239-263, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:168:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0358-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0358-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-016-0358-z
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Valentino Larcinese & Leonzio Rizzo & Cecilia Testa, 2005. "Allocating the US Federal Budget to the States: the Impact of the President," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 03, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    2. Lazear, Edward P, 1997. "Incentives in Basic Research," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 167-197, January.
    3. Marilyn Young & Michael Reksulak & William F. Shughart, 2001. "The Political Economy of the IRS," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 201-220, July.
    4. Matt E. Ryan, 2014. "Allocating Infection: The Political Economy Of The Swine Flu (H1n1) Vaccine," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 138-154, January.
    5. Raphaël Godefroy, 2010. "The birth of the congressional clinic," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564921, HAL.
    6. Sampat, Bhaven N., 2012. "Mission-oriented biomedical research at the NIH," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(10), pages 1729-1741.
    7. Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-1235, December.
    8. Hunter, William J & Nelson, Michael A, 1995. "Tax Enforcement: A Public Choice Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 82(1-2), pages 53-67, January.
    9. Thomas A. Garrett & Russell S. Sobel, 2003. "The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(3), pages 496-509, July.
    10. Deepak Hegde, 2009. "Political Influence behind the Veil of Peer Review: An Analysis of Public Biomedical Research Funding in the United States," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 665-690, November.
    11. Jim F. Couch & William F. Shughart III, 1998. "The Political Economy of the New Deal," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1561, June.
    12. Andrew Young & Russell Sobel, 2013. "Recovery and Reinvestment Act spending at the state level: Keynesian stimulus or distributive politics?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 449-468, June.
    13. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-163, February.
    14. Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October.
    15. Wallis, John Joseph, 1987. "Employment, Politics, and Economic Recovery during the Great Depression," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 69(3), pages 516-520, August.
    16. Henry W. Chappell & Thomas M. Havrilesky & Rob Roy McGregor, 1993. "Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(1), pages 185-218.
    17. R. Coats & Gökhan Karahan & Robert Tollison, 2006. "Terrorism and pork-barrel spending," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 275-287, July.
    18. Anderson, Gary M & Tollison, Robert D, 1991. "Congressional Influence and Patterns of New Deal Spending, 1933-1939," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 161-175, April.
    19. Barry Weingast, 1984. "The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 147-191, January.
    20. A. Colin Cameron & Douglas L. Miller, 2015. "A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 50(2), pages 317-372.
    21. Faith, Roger L & Leavens, Donald R & Tollison, Robert D, 1982. "Antitrust Pork Barrel," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(2), pages 329-342, October.
    22. Reading, Don C., 1973. "New Deal Activity and the States, 1933 to 1939," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(04), pages 792-810, December.
    23. Lea-Rachel D. Kosnik, 2006. "Sources of Bureaucratic Delay: A Case Study of FERC Dam Relicensing," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 258-288, April.
    24. Grier, Kevin B & McDonald, Michael & Tollison, Robert D, 1995. "Electoral Politics and the Executive Veto: A Predictive Theory," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(3), pages 427-440, July.
    25. Chappell, Henry Jr. & Havrilesky, Thomas M. & McGregor, Rob Roy, 1995. "Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 113-136, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    NIH; Political economy; Congressional dominance; Presidential politics;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:168:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0358-z. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.