Tax Enforcement: A Public Choice Perspective
Federal income tax enforcement varies greatly across individual states. While it is not known if this interstate variation enhances efficiency, anecdotal evidence suggests it does not. In this paper, the authors apply the model of B. R. Weingast and M. Moran (1983) to the treasury and explore the relationship between the legislature and the IRS. Specifically, they model IRS audit rates by state as a function of both political and efficiency considerations. The authors find that the interstate difference in enforcement is influenced by efficiency considerations but also the IRS shifts enforcement away from states represented by legislators who sit on committees with oversight responsibility for the IRS. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:82:y:1995:i:1-2:p:53-67. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.