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Property insurance against debris-flow disasters based on risk assessment and the principal–agent theory

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  • Mingtao Ding
  • Fangqiang Wei
  • Kaiheng Hu

Abstract

Dongchuan City is highly threatened by debris-flow disasters originating from Shengou gully, a typical debris-flow gully along Xiaojiang River in Yunnan Province (Kang et al. 2004 ). Shengou gully is studied, and a hazard assessment with numerical simulation is developed using ArcGIS 9.2 software. Debris-flow numerical simulation is an important method for predicting debris-flow inundation regions, zoning debris-flow risks, and helping in the design of debris-flow control works. Meanwhile, vulnerability measurement is essential for hazard and risk research. Based on the self-organized map neural network method, we combine the six vulnerability indicators to create an integrated debris-flow vulnerability map that depicts the vulnerability levels of Dongchuan City in Shengou Basin. Based on the risk assessment (including hazard assessment and vulnerability assessment), we adopt the principal–agent theory and use the risk degree of debris flows as an important index to build the insurance model and analyze the insurance premium of debris-flow disasters in Dongchuan City. This paper discusses the model and mechanism of property insurance in debris-flow risk regions and aims to provide technical support for insurance companies to participate in disaster prevention and reduction. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Mingtao Ding & Fangqiang Wei & Kaiheng Hu, 2012. "Property insurance against debris-flow disasters based on risk assessment and the principal–agent theory," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 60(3), pages 801-817, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:nathaz:v:60:y:2012:i:3:p:801-817
    DOI: 10.1007/s11069-011-9897-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Zhifei Deng & Jifu Liu & Lanlan Guo & Jiaoyang Li & Junming Li & Yiru Jia, 2021. "Pure risk premium rating of debris flows based on a dynamic run-out model: a case study in Anzhou, China," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 106(1), pages 235-253, March.

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