IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/revage/v16y1994i1p93-102..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Countercyclicity of Government Transfers: A Political Pressure Group Approach

Author

Listed:
  • David S. Bullock

Abstract

Farmers receive greater subsidies from the government during times of relatively unfavorable market conditions. A generalization of Becker's (1983) model is presented that offers an explanation of how political pressure groups respond to market forces. In the model, pressure groups compete for government transfers, but market conditions affect political agents' political expenditures. Political agents can be altruistic, taxpaying interest groups can perceive benefits (not just costs) of transfer programs, and subsidy-receiving interest groups can perceive costs (not just benefits) of transfer programs. The model offers a formal explanation of transfer countercyclical within the general framework of models of competition among political pressure groups.

Suggested Citation

  • David S. Bullock, 1994. "The Countercyclicity of Government Transfers: A Political Pressure Group Approach," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 93-102.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revage:v:16:y:1994:i:1:p:93-102.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1349524
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Garrett, Thomas A. & Marsh, Thomas L. & Marshall, Maria I., 2006. "Political allocation of US agriculture disaster payments in the 1990s," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 143-161, June.
    2. Bullock, David S. & Mittenzwei, Klaus, 2005. "Using Evolutionary Game Theory to Examine U.S. and EU Agricultural Policy Institutions," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24538, European Association of Agricultural Economists.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:revage:v:16:y:1994:i:1:p:93-102.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press or Christopher F. Baum (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aaeaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.