IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/defpea/v17y2006i5p413-419.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Note On The Economics Of Standby Versus Standing Peacekeeping Forces

Author

Listed:
  • Louis Parai

Abstract

With UN peacekeeping activities in recent years having become more numerous, complex and costly, alternative means of responding to emerging crises and conflicts are being proposed and considered, along with their financial costs and funding. This paper analyzes the economic costs and benefits of recent options from a global resource point of view. It is concluded that standby forces provided by Member States to the UN, such as the multinational Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG) and the more recent European Union (EU) Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), appear presently to be economically the most efficient means of providing UN peacekeeping. Standby forces, acknowledged by the UN as a feasible alternative to a UN standing army or police force, are economically the most efficient basically because they utilize more fully the existing military resources of Member States, rather than require major additional new resources for peacekeeping.

Suggested Citation

  • Louis Parai, 2006. "A Note On The Economics Of Standby Versus Standing Peacekeeping Forces," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(5), pages 413-419.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:17:y:2006:i:5:p:413-419
    DOI: 10.1080/10242690600888197
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10242690600888197
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/10242690600888197?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jyoti Khanna & Todd Sandler & Hirofumi Shimizu, 1998. "Sharing the Financial Burden for U.N. and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976-1996," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(2), pages 176-195, April.
    2. Davis B. Bobrow & Mark A. Boyer, 1997. "Maintaining System Stability," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(6), pages 723-748, December.
    3. Jyoti Khanna & Todd Sandler, 1997. "Conscription, peace-keeping, and foreign assistance: NATO burden sharing in the post-cold war era," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 101-121.
    4. Sandler, Todd & Khanna, Jyoti & Shimizu, Hirofumi, 1998. "Sharing the Financial Burden for Un and Nato Peacekeeping: 1976-96," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1216, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bruce Linster & Richard Fullerton & Michael Mckee & Stephen Slate, 2001. "Rent-seeking models of international competition: An experimental investigation," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 285-302.
    2. Ugurhan G. Berkok & Binyam Solomon, 2011. "Peacekeeping, Private Benefits and Common Agency," Chapters, in: Derek L. Braddon & Keith Hartley (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Binyam Solomon, 2004. "Nato burden sharing revisited," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 251-258.
    4. Hirofumi Shimizu & Todd Sandler, 2010. "Recent peacekeeping burden sharing," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(15), pages 1479-1484.
    5. Ansink, Erik & Weikard, Hans-Peter & Withagen, Cees, 2019. "International environmental agreements with support," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 241-252.
    6. Erik Ansink & Cees A. Withagen, 2016. "Members, Joiners, Free-Riders, Supporters," CESifo Working Paper Series 5802, CESifo.
    7. Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521875578, December.
    8. Andrew Boutton & Vito D’Orazio, 2020. "Buying blue helmets: The role of foreign aid in the construction of UN peacekeeping missions," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(2), pages 312-328, March.
    9. Katharina P Coleman & Benjamin Nyblade, 2018. "Peacekeeping for profit? The scope and limits of ‘mercenary’ UN peacekeeping," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 55(6), pages 726-741, November.
    10. Renaud Bellais & Martial Foucault & Jean-Michel Oudot, 2014. "Économie de la défense," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01052607, HAL.
    11. Magnus Lundgren & Kseniya Oksamytna & Katharina P Coleman, 2021. "Only as fast as its troop contributors: Incentives, capabilities, and constraints in the UN’s peacekeeping response," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(4), pages 671-686, July.
    12. Tony Addison & Mark McGillivray & Matthew Odedokun, 2004. "Donor Funding of Multilateral Aid Agencies: Determining Factors and Revealed Burden Sharing," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 173-191, February.
    13. Philip Jones, 2007. "Colluding victims: A public choice analysis of international alliances," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 319-332, September.
    14. Bernhard Klingen, 2011. "A Public Choice Perspective on Defense and Alliance Policy," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 17, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Jomana Amara, 2008. "Nato Defense Expenditures: Common Goals Or Diverging Interests? A Structural Analysis," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(6), pages 449-469.
    16. Tim Haesebrouck, 2017. "NATO Burden Sharing in Libya," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(10), pages 2235-2261, November.
    17. Hirofumi Shimizu & Todd Sandler, 2003. "NATO Peacekeeping and Burden Sharing: 1994-2000," Public Finance Review, , vol. 31(2), pages 123-143, March.
    18. Claudia Perez-Formes & Alain Cuenca, 2001. "Nato in the post-cold war: An empirical analysis," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(5), pages 487-496.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:17:y:2006:i:5:p:413-419. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/GDPE20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.