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Colluding victims: A public choice analysis of international alliances

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  • Philip Jones

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  • Philip Jones, 2007. "Colluding victims: A public choice analysis of international alliances," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 319-332, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:132:y:2007:i:3:p:319-332
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9154-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. G. Sharp, 2005. "The economic costs and benefits of UK defence exports: a comment," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 59-66.
    2. Sandler,Todd & Hartley,Keith, 1999. "The Political Economy of NATO," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521630931, December.
    3. Kaemfer, William H & Lowenberg, Anton D, 1988. "The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 786-793, September.
    4. Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, 2004. "Are Voters Better Informed When They Have a Larger Say in Politics? -- Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(1_2), pages 31-59, April.
    5. Todd Sandler, 1993. "The Economic Theory of Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 446-483, September.
    6. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    7. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition," Working Paper 517, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    8. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553773, December.
    9. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    10. Jones, Philip R, 1996. "Rents from In-Kind Subsidy: "Charity" in the Public Sector," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 86(3-4), pages 359-378, March.
    11. Philip Jones, 1999. "Rent seeking and defence expenditure," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(2), pages 171-190.
    12. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, December.
    13. Le Breton, Michel & Salanie, Francois, 2003. "Lobbying under political uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2589-2610, December.
    14. Charles K. Rowley, 2001. "The international economy in public choice perspective," Chapters, in: William F. Shughart II & Laura Razzolini (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, chapter 30, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Jyoti Khanna & Todd Sandler, 1997. "Conscription, peace-keeping, and foreign assistance: NATO burden sharing in the post-cold war era," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 101-121.
    16. Sandler, Todd & Forbes, John F, 1980. "Burden Sharing, Strategy, and the Design of NATO," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(3), pages 425-444, July.
    17. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. Libman, Alexander, 2009. "Russian federalism and post-Soviet integration: Divergence of development paths," MPRA Paper 12944, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. William Phelan, 2008. "Open International Markets without Exclusion: Encompassing Domestic Institutions, Excludable Goods, and International Public Goods," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp245, IIIS.
    3. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWER In the Federation]," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Abul Naga, Ramses H. & Jones, Philip, 2012. "Better to give than to receive? Altruistic provision of a global public good," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 480-483.
    5. Bernhard Klingen, 2011. "A Public Choice Perspective on Defense and Alliance Policy," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 17, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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